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Blaming for Columbine
Conceptions of Agency in the Contemporary United States
by Claudia Strauss
Modern Westerners are supposed to embrace a notion of unfettered personal agency. An analysis of
public commentary (interviews, editorials, and online message boards) in the United States about
the Columbine school shootings shows that the voluntarist cultural model of persons as autonomous
agents, while certainly very important, is just one of a number of cultural models Americans use to
explain human action and has particular political and interpersonal uses. We might think that
conceptions as basic as those of personhood and agency would be hegemonic: both singular and
internalized as unexamined, taken-for-granted assumptions. In some contexts, voluntarist ideas about
agency are taken for granted, but in others they are promoted quite deliberately. A particularly
interesting phenomenon in the United States at this time is the presence of a discourse that may be
called defensive voluntarism, an explicit, argumentative version of voluntarism invoked to combat
other widely circulating views of behavior. The very need for emphatic pronouncement betrays
speakers’ awareness that voluntarism needs to be defended. These findings point to the need for a
person-and-context-centered approach to social discourses instead of one that assumes discourses
to be constitutive.

On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold took an
arsenal of guns and improvised explosive devices to school
and killed 12 of their classmates, a teacher, and themselves at
Columbine High School near Littleton, Colorado, setting off
a moral panic (Cohen 1972) in the United States. Many U.S.
Americans had cultural models according to which senseless
violence was associated with poverty, cities, and people of
color (Newman et al. 2004). But the two shooters were white
and middle-class, a description that applies equally well to
Littleton, Colorado. Moreover, while the Columbine High
massacre was the deadliest such event up to that time,1 it was
one of a series of similar violent episodes in the late 1990s,
in which boys in suburban and rural schools in the United
States shot classmates and teachers, seemingly at random.
These school shootings became the focus of movies (Elephant,
Zero Day, Bowling for Columbine), novels (Shooter, Vernon
God Little, Nineteen Minutes), an Eminem song (“I’m Back”),
a Marilyn Manson album (“Holy Wood [In the Shadow of
the Valley of Death]”), Christian martyrdom tales (e.g., Rachel’s Tears), academic analyses (e.g., Lieberman 2006; Newman et al. 2004; Watson 2002), social activism, and government policy making. Blame for these shootings was cast on
Claudia Strauss is Professor of Anthropology at Pitzer College
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the content of the movies, music, and video games the shooters watched, listened to, and played, the too-ready availability
of guns, bad parenting, lack of religion in schools, and a toxic
peer culture that made them outcasts—almost everywhere, in
fact, than on the shooters’ own freely chosen actions. This is
surprising in terms of widely shared assumptions about the
way Americans think about agency, personhood, and moral
responsibility.
A number of scholars have criticized simple, Orientalist
portraits of passive, fatalistic South Asians and other nonWesterners. A significant body of work is developing on cultural conceptions of agency outside of the West. One purpose
of this article is to contribute to this body of literature by
investigating cultural conceptions of agency in the contemporary United States. The flip side of the portrait of passive,
fatalistic non-Westerners is the standard account of modern
Westerners as embracing a notion of unfettered personal
agency. As Shweder and Bourne put it, the Western “autonomous individual imagines the incredible, that he lives within
an inviolate protected region (the extended boundaries of the
self) where he is ‘free to choose’” (1984, 192). This is “the
free agent of Western fantasy” (Ortner 1996, 11). I argue here
that there is some truth to this description, but it is only a
partial truth. In the first part of this article, I demonstrate
that the cultural model of persons as autonomous agents,
1. The deadliest of “school shootings” are limited to elementary, junior
high, and high schools in the United States.
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while certainly very important in the contemporary United
States, is just one of a number of cultural models Americans
use to explain human action. Following Ortner (1996, 11), I
will call this cultural model voluntarism. Voluntarism in this
sense is not the political philosopher’s view that human relations should be voluntary but the metaphysical assumption
that human actions are the result of unfettered voluntary
choices. The voluntarist in this sense may be aware of external
factors that have an effect on behavior but still highlights the
individual’s freedom to choose how to act.2
Listening to interviews I have conducted over the past 20
years in the United States, as well as public discourse on
different social issues, I have been struck by the variety of
notions of agency, personhood, and moral responsibility that
circulate in this society. While actors are sometimes depicted
in voluntarist terms as masters of their fate, other accounts
reveal a more passive view of persons assumed to be shaped
by role models, media messages, peer pressure, and the quality
of the nurturing they received in childhood. Even among
individualistic models of human action, which focus on causes
of behavior internal to the person, there is variety: not all
individualistic cultural models are voluntarist.
Now, the objection could be—and has been—raised that
discourse3 about Columbine and other school shootings is
not a good test case because the shooters were seen as too
young or too deeply abnormal to be capable of taking personal
responsibility for their actions.4 I agree that these circumstances may help to explain the high proportion of explanations pinning blame on factors outside the shooters. However, the nonvoluntarist discourses that were called upon to
explain the Columbine shootings were not invented on the
spot. Commentary about the Columbine shootings was unusual in that a great variety of discourses that embed conflicting notions of personhood and agency were offered in a
short period of time, raising people’s consciousness of alternatives. But alternatives to voluntarism can be readily heard
in public discourse because they are commonly invoked in
discussions ranging from public policy to everyday explanations of one’s own and others’ behavior.
In the second part of my analysis, I turn to the uses of
2. The voluntarist in this sense could hold either that free will is
compatible or that it is incompatible with determinism. In folk thought
these philosophical issues are not addressed.
3. Cultural models are learned, shared cognitive schemas (Quinn and
Holland 1987); social discourses are standardized ways of verbalizing a
cultural model or ideology (Bakhtin 1981).
4. The first objection was voiced to me by Dan Segal (personal communication, September 2004), the second by Joel Robbins (personal communication, April 2006). Some psychologists have made the opposite
prediction about explanations of behavior perceived as abnormal: “[individualistic] dispositional causes are most clearly perceived . . . when
behavior deviates from expectations of a social role . . . or from a norm
of social desirability” (Morris and Peng 1994, 950). (See also Miller 1984,
who found that a higher proportion of U.S. subjects gave dispositional
attributions when explaining deviant behaviors than when explaining
prosocial behaviors.)
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different discourses of agency, showing that voluntarist explanations are considered appropriate for some contexts
but not others. I also show that voluntarist cultural conceptions (like many other cultural models [Quinn and
Holland 1987]) can be held and expressed in a deeply
implicit, taken-for-granted way and in a highly explicit,
consciously assertive way. We might think that conceptions
as basic as those of personhood and agency would be hegemonic: both singular and internalized as unexamined,
taken-for-granted assumptions. In some contexts, voluntarist ideas about agency are taken for granted, but in
others they are promoted quite deliberately. A particularly
interesting phenomenon in the United States at this time
is the presence of a discourse I call defensive voluntarism,
an explicit, argumentative version of voluntarism used to
combat other widely circulating explanations for behavior.
Multiple cultural models of agency give speakers alternatives to draw upon depending on their rhetorical goals,
within the limits of their taken-for-granted assumptions
about behavioral causation. This person-and-context-centered view of social discourses requires an approach that
combines psychological and social analysis.

Research on Cultural Concepts of Agency
What is “agency”? Ahearn’s review of anthropological work
on agency and language (2001b) notes a tendency, especially
outside of anthropology, to equate agency with free will. She
criticizes this definition for ignoring the social construction
of action (p. 114). It is inadequate for my purposes as well,
because the very point of this study is to see whether agency
is equated with free will by contemporary U.S. Americans,
so a broader definition is needed. As Ahearn notes, among
anthropologists and other social theorists, another common
definition of agency is resistance rather than conformity to
the social order, which is also too narrow (Ahearn 2001b,
115; see also Frank 2006). The definition I will use instead
is one proposed by Karp (1986): “Agent refers to persons
engaged in the exercise of power in its primary sense of the
‘bringing about of effects,’ that is, engaged in action that is
constitutive. Agency implies the idea of ‘causal power’” (p.
137 n. 1; see also Rosenblatt 2004, 468). With this definition
of agency, another way of putting my question is “What did
commentators on the Columbine shootings believe caused
the shootings? Specifically, what causes were most responsible, and who was morally blameworthy?” This is a question
about attributions: after-the-fact explanations for our own
and others’ behavior, divided by social psychologists (too
simply, I will show) between dispositional attributions, which
explain behaviors in terms of agents’ stable internal traits,
and situational attributions, which explain behaviors in
terms of contextual factors (Heider 1958; Ross 1977). Such
attributions in turn rest on cultural models of personhood,
particularly folk theories regarding the causes of human
behavior.
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Some cultural psychologists have argued that cross-culturally there are two basic models of personhood and agency: a
notion of an “independent self” and “disjoint agency” that is
typical of the West, especially of middle-class European Americans, and a notion of an “interdependent self” and “conjoint
agency” that is typical of the rest of the world. According to
Markus and Kitayama (1991, 2003), in individualistic societies
with notions of disjoint agency, “agency is the exclusive property of individuals and resides within individuals” (2003, 12)
and “outcomes of actions are largely personally controllable”
(p. 7); “because individuals are cast as under their own steam,
as self-directed, they are also seen as morally responsible for
their own actions” (p. 12). In the model of conjoint agency
that is typical of non-Westerners, by contrast, “outcomes are
[seen as] largely jointly determined and controlled” (p. 7; see
also Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan 1999; Menon et al. 1999;
Miller 1984; Morris and Peng 1994).
Anthropologists have discussed cultural conceptions of
agency in a variety of works, many of which aim to challenge
the pervasive portrait of passive, fatalistic Asians (e.g., Ewing
1991; Mines 1988; Fox 1996 and the other essays collected in
Dissanayake 1996). In an interesting discussion, Ortner (1997,
148) argues, “Far from constructing anything resembling
‘Oriental fatalism,’ . . . Sherpa religion constructs a certain
kind of quite effective agency”, although the average person
is seen as weak, the power of the gods can be shaped to one’s
ends. Ahearn finds a “new, more individualistic sense of
agency,” especially among younger residents of the Nepal village where she did her fieldwork, in contradistinction to “residual ideas regarding fate” held especially by older residents
(2001a, 248; see also Shore 1982 and Jackson and Karp 1990
for views of personhood and agency in Samoa and Africa,
respectively).
However, with the exceptions noted below, there has not
been the same movement to render a more subtle analysis of
Western notions of agency.5 In fact, it is common to the point
of being a cliché for social theorists to criticize “that unified
and freely choosing individual who is the normative male
subject of Western bourgeois liberalism” (Pathak and Rajan
1989, 572, quoted in Ortner 1995, 185). Many such texts focus
on theoretical questions about social action (see also Holland
et al. 1998); empirical questions about the hegemony of voluntarism in the contemporary West are not at issue.
Some poststructuralist and critical theorists have made
Western concepts of agency more central to their analysis.
Rose, for example, is concerned with the way psychotherapy
and other “technologies of the self” have stressed self construction: “the individual is to become, as it were, an entrepreneur of itself, seeking to maximize its own powers, its own
5. See Strauss (2000, 90) for speculation about why this might be so
for the related question of American person concepts. On the broader
issue of whether there are sociocentric elements to American person
concepts, see, e.g., Gaines (1984), Hollan (1992), Holland and Kipnis
(1994), and Spiro (1993).
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happiness, its own quality of life, through enhancing its autonomy and then instrumentalizing its autonomous choices
in the service of its life-style” (1996, 158). Rose points out
that this therapeutic effort to enhance feelings of personal
autonomy is consistent with neoliberal political economic discourses focusing on personal “autonomy,” “choice,” and “responsibility” instead of government social welfare programs,
and he claims that neoliberal discourse “was not an idiosyncratic obsession of the right of the political spectrum. On the
contrary, it resonated with basic presuppositions concerning
the contemporary human being that remain widely distributed . . . presuppositions that are embodied in the very language that we use to make persons thinkable” (p. 151; see
Walkerdine 2006, 39 n. 2 for speculation that such neoliberal
person concepts are “more naturalized in the United States”
than in Europe).6
In some scholarly genealogies, voluntarist beliefs are traced
from Hellenistic Greece to Christ’s and Paul’s teaching that
“the Christian is an ‘individual-in-relation-to-God’ (Dumont
1985, 98), a view that was developed particularly through the
practice of the Catholic confessional (Abercrombie, Hill, and
Turner 1986, 171). With Protestantism, especially the Arminian version that stressed free will, resistible grace (humans
have free will and can resist God’s call to salvation), and
conditional predestination (God predestines for salvation only
those He knows will accept Him),7 so one story goes, came
the “Protestant ethic” of rational, disciplined self-control,
which places complete moral responsibility on the individual
(Weber 1958 [1904–5]). Marx stressed instead the need under
industrial capitalism for ideological support for a concept of
the unfettered individual, free to sell his or her labor power
(e.g., Marx 1973 [1939–41]).
This quick intellectual history should not be taken as a
given. Marx and Weber, in particular, complicated this simple picture quite a bit, with Marx also stressing the illusion,
under capitalism, that commodities have a life of their own
and control us (Marx 1978 [1867]) and Weber arguing that
with the maturation of capitalism came a diminution of the
sense of individual control. (“The Puritan wanted to work
in a calling; we are forced to do so” [Weber 1958 (1904–5),
181]). Murray (1993, 9) points out that Christian notions
of the self cannot be so easily summarized and suggests that
the kind of selfhood that is often taken to be the bedrock
of Western thought is actually a product of “the Romanticist
literary movement in the late 18th century” (see also Gaines
1984 on the difference between mainline Protestant and
evangelical Protestant, as well as Catholic, person concepts
and Spiro 1993). The point here is only that there is a
6. But see Foucault’s observation that, compared with German and
French neoliberal theorists, American neoliberal theorists, especially the
Chicago School economist Gary S. Becker, tend to be behaviorists, a view
that is at odds with voluntarism: “The American neo-liberal homo economicus is manipulable man, man who is perpetually responsive to modifications in his environment” (quoted in Gordon 1991, 43).
7. http://www.byronbible.org/ask/man/arminian2.html.
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considerable body of scholarly work claiming that in “the
West” (i.e., dominant traditions in the Christian, European,
industrial capitalist West) there developed a notion of the
individual as a morally and metaphysically distinct being,
completely free to choose his or her own actions, hence
responsible for them.
A handful of anthropologists and other researchers working in the United States have advanced our understanding
of concepts of agency in this country. Kusserow (2004, 20)
criticizes “a reverse Orientalism (an Occidentalism, so to
speak)” in which “the Western self is often flattened into a
supposedly uniform and rather generic individualism.” One
way of demonstrating greater complexity is to show subtle
differences between U.S. social groups. Thus Kusserow differentiates the “hard” protective and mobility-oriented individualist child-rearing ideals of working-class New Yorkers
in Queens from the “soft” expressive individualism of upper-middle-class Manhattanites (see also Bellah et al. 1985).
Although Kusserow does not explicitly focus on cultural
models of agency, they are implicit in her interview material.
Working-class interviewees living in a dangerous neighborhood believed that the self had to be toughened to resist
bad influences. In the words of one mother, “If you don’t
have your own self-awareness, then anyone can get inside
of you and change you” (p. 35). Upper-middle-class interviewees, instead, thought that children should be encouraged
to express their uniqueness, which they saw as easily damaged by harsh child-rearing methods. Thus, corresponding
to class-typical individualistic ideals were class-typical understandings about forces constraining choices: bad social
influences for the lower working class, psychologically damaging child-rearing for the upper middle class. Class differences were also noted by Desjarlais (1997, 210, table 1), who
found a difference between the “direct, active, autonomous”
form of agency advocated by the staff of a homeless shelter,
the “oblique, indirect” form of agency practiced by shelter
residents, and the “reactive, passive” form of agency of street
people.
Others have noted contextual variation in the expression
of different cultural models of agency. Hill and Zepeda (1992)
speculate that “for many Americans, ‘individuality’ as the locus of responsibility and agency may be largely an artifact of
formal and public life as constituted through the legal system,
through the practice of formal religion, and in formal political
and economic discourse. It may not be salient in quotidian
accounts of experience” (p. 222). Linde (1993) finds that when
middle-class Americans explains their career trajectories, the
unmarked common sense is voluntarist: They are supposed
to show that they exercised agency in choosing a career that
fit their personal characteristics. Problematic career narratives
are ones in which one mentions having an “in” or being overly
influenced by others8 or having a career path that seems too
8. Quinn and Mathews (2005), to the contrary, found that their interviewees readily credited mentors in their career narratives.
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accidental or too determined. At the same time, however,
some of Linde’s interviewees employed specialized discourses,
such as Freudian and behaviorist psychology, and told stories
that reduced their personal agency in line with these theories
(something unconscious made them act a certain way, or they
were responding to others’ reinforcement). Expanding Linde’s
analysis, McCollum (2002) shows that when Americans tell
stories about how they found their romantic partners, they
“deny that intentions and desires played a significant casual
role in bringing them together” (p. 121). In other words,
Americans have a variety of cultural models of agency, and
there are conventions regarding which ones are appropriate
in a given communicative event (see Ahearn 2001a for a
similar finding in Nepal).
In what follows I expand upon this literature in several
ways. First, I document a wider range of alternatives to voluntarist cultural models of agency than other scholars have
found, including cultural models that are individualistic but
not voluntarist. Another layer of complexity that has not been
addressed is variation in conscious awareness of such models,
related to variation in what I have called their cultural standing (Strauss 2004), that is, the speaker’s sense of how widely
accepted the model is. A widely shared sense that voluntarism
is under attack has generated an especially emphatic, defensive
form of voluntarist discourse in response in a number of
realms. In conclusion, I draw together psychological, cultural,
and socio-historical analyses to speculate about the reasons
for this complexity.
My larger aim is to show that with a person-centered9 and
context-specific approach, rather than one that is discoursecentered, we can better understand the political, interpersonal,
and psychological reasons for expressing one model rather
than another and better appreciate the cultural standing of
those ideas. By a “discourse-centered” approach, I mean one
(usually influenced by Foucault) that focuses on a small number of prevalent discourses traced through a variety of institutions and, typically, written tracts. This approach has inspired some excellent work, but it risks overstating the
influence of those discourses. Instead, a person-and-contextcentered approach focuses not simply on discourses but also
on persons using them, deliberately or unwittingly. In so doing, we gain both a better appreciation of the purposes these
discourses serve for speakers and an appreciation of the discourses’ standing.
9. What follows is not classic person-centered research with a careful
exploration of individuals’ subjectivity. However, it is person-centered
theoretically because my unit of analysis is persons using discourses and
because I consider psychological explanations rather than taking discourses as actors (see LeVine 1982 and Hollan 2001 for theoretical discussions). In contrast to the usual person-centered research (including
my own previous work), however, this discussion also explores situational
factors that make a particular cultural model more salient or useful for
a speaker at a given time.
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Concepts of Agency
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One could try to draw out people’s conceptions of agency
through abstract discussions about why people behave as they
do. That method, however, is likely to elicit only those folk
theories of behavior that people have been taught or that they
use consciously (Bourdieu 1977 [1972], 18). People’s implicit
beliefs about causes of human behavior are better elicited by
discussion of specific cases, particularly examples of problematic or unusual behavior (Morris and Peng 1994). One sort
of problematic behavior, in the United States, is economic
failure, and I have previously examined voluntarist and nonvoluntarist explanations for poverty (Strauss 2000, 2002). The
April 1999 shootings at Columbine High occurred while I
was thinking about voluntarism in connection with discourses
about welfare and poverty. I realized that the alternatives to
voluntarism I had observed in discussions of welfare policy
were even more apparent in public commentary on school
shootings and decided to investigate further.
My data collection went through three stages. First, I included a question about school shootings as part of a series
of interviews I conducted on concepts of a good society in
the spring of 2000 with a racially and socioeconomically diverse group of 27 men and women in North Carolina.10 (With
three interviewees I failed to raise the subject, so the final
pool is 24 people.) The topic was salient enough that some
interviewees brought it up spontaneously, but if they did not,
then I asked, “How do you explain all of these school shootings we’ve been having lately?” This was just one of a large
number of topics we discussed, including their life histories;
therefore I did not explore it in depth. My interviewees are
all identified with their chosen pseudonyms and, on first mention, capsule descriptions of their occupations to show the
wide social distribution of these cultural models.
While my interviewees were quite diverse and this method
had the virtue of including people who did not volunteer on
the basis of their particular concern with the topic of school
shootings, they were all located in one state. To get a broader
base of public opinion on school shootings, I also downloaded
editorials, op-ed essays, and letters to the editor written immediately after the Columbine shootings from the regional
U.S. newspapers that Lexis-Nexis searches. I took the first 100
items listed from a search with the keywords “Columbine”

or “Littleton” and “editorial” for April 1999, which resulted
in 106 editorial pieces.11 This added many examples of unelicited discourse from all over the country. However, editorial
writers are limited to members of newspapers’ editorial staffs,
op-ed authors are supposed to be experts, and writers of
letters to the editor tend to be atypical; for example, in this
sample there were three times as many male as female authors
for the signed letters and op-eds. In the following discussion
the letters and editorials are cited with the published name
and the newspaper in which it appeared.
An even broader range of commentary came to my attention when, in April 2004, to mark the five-year anniversary
of the Columbine shootings, America Online ran two news
stories related to the shootings and invited discussion in their
electronic message boards. These are not live chat rooms but
websites where people can post comments that start discussion threads and respond to previous comments. Sometimes
several people respond to each other’s posts within a short
time period, creating a series of comments that reads like an
unmoderated, highly contentious focus group. I downloaded
and printed hundreds of these comments. To keep the project
manageable I analyzed the first 337 of them (all the messages
in 18 threads), submitted from 229 screen names. Like those
who submit letters to the editor, these writers are self-selected,
limited to those with strong feelings about the topic, and it
is possible that some are not U.S. residents. An advantage of
this source, however, is that by 2004 Internet access was so
widespread that a great diversity of people was represented
and the message boards’ anonymity permitted free expression
of what would normally be self-censored or euphemized
views. One taboo view I found expressed nowhere else but
here was praise for the Columbine shooters and, occasionally,
expression of the writer’s desire to do the same. Other message
board reactions to this sort of comment brought into relief
some of the interpersonal reasons for articulating voluntarism.
In the following discussion the electronic bulletin board postings are cited by the writer’s screen name, slightly altered to
prevent exact identification but with the character of the original screen name preserved because a screen name is an important part of a writer’s self-representation.
In the discussion below I take no stance on the truth of
any of the explanations offered for the Columbine shootings.
My focus, instead, is on what they reveal about ways of think-

10. All but 5 interviewees were recruited through a random sample
phone survey. Participants in the survey were asked if they were willing
to participate in face-to-face interviews. Fifteen of the interviewees came
from the upper-middle-class Research Triangle Park suburbs and the
other 12 from the former textile mill town of Burlington and several
small towns around it in Alamance Country, North Carolina. There were
13 women and 14 men, 21 who considered themselves white (including
2 who mentioned some Native American ancestry) and 6 who considered
themselves black. Seven were professionals with advanced degrees, 8 were
in or had held managerial positions in a business, government, or nonprofit agency, 6 were clerical, secretarial, and other service workers, 4
were manual laborers, and 2 were students.

11. Lexis-Nexis starts with the most recent items and works back, so
the first editorials listed from the April search came from the end of the
month. They are listed alphabetically by the name of the newspaper in
which they appeared. I stopped at item 93, which took me through the
complete alphabetical list of papers for April 30 and April 29, rather than
overcounting the newspapers at the top of the alphabet for a part of a
third day’s sample. A single document for Lexis-Nexis might be the entire
letters page of a paper. Counting each individual letter separately, then
subtracting duplicates (e.g., of syndicated columns) and irrelevant items
(e.g., ones discussing the behavior of the police during the shootings or
ministers at the funerals), I ended up with 106 separate pieces. I have
also excluded the 4 Canadian editorial pieces from this analysis.
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ing and talking about human behavior, agency, and moral
responsibility in the contemporary United States.

Concepts of Agency and Moral Responsibility
in Talk about School Shootings
Classic Voluntarism
Following an earlier school shooting incident in Jonesboro,
Arkansas, the online version of the libertarian magazine Reason (Reasononline, whose motto is “Free minds and free markets”) commented on the kinds of explanations that were
offered in that case. The headline for the story was “Blame
society first: Individual responsibility is the truly unthinkable.” The author, Brian Doherty, was disgusted with the inclination of experts to displace blame from those he considered most responsible, the shooters themselves. Here is an
excerpt from his essay:
A USA Today headline states it baldly: “Who’s to blame for
school shooting? We all are.”
Even if the blame-everyone-else-first impulse makes no
discernible moral sense, it makes a great deal of political
sense. After all, if only the perpetrators of crimes are to
blame for them, then there’s nothing much for government
to do but nab those perpetrators, hold a trial, and, if a guilty
verdict is brought down, impose a punishment.
But if social forces, or guns, or violent TV shows and
movies are to blame, then cops and judges aren’t enough.
We need programs, crusades, and concerted government
action to try to change the very nature of our culture and
society. We need V-chips, gun control, a revived economy,
and new forms of educational indoctrination. [. . .]12
A Los Angeles Times headline on reaction to the shooting
said it all: “Violent culture, media share blame, experts say.”
Indeed, who else would say it? The culture of experts demands complicated answers, even if they don’t make much
sense.
Alternately, evil could be traced to its root cause, the one
thing that makes it possible no matter what outside forces
are brought to bear: individual choice. But to the experts,
it is too simple to say someone has done wrong and must
be punished. The tangled web of “social forces” is always
there to be pored over, analyzed, charted, and regressed.
[. . .]
The advantage the state takes from blaming social forces
for individual mistakes or crimes goes beyond the sort of
colorful violence that makes the newspapers. All sorts of
social problems for which politicians scramble to find solutions, from single-parent households to drug abuse to
12. My conventions for transcriptions and other quotes are as follows:
. . ., lengthy pause; [. . .], deletion; [word], uncertain transcription;
underscore, speaker’s emphasis; p, latching (no perceptible pause between turns); (( )), backchannel. Parenthetical phrases in italics are contextual or paralinguistic cues. Stammers and verbal fillers were omitted.
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long-term welfare dependence, result from the cumulative
effects of bad decisions made by individuals—decisions that
are never made by everyone in the same social milieu. Avoiding pregnancy, educating oneself, and becoming self-sufficient are within the power of most individuals, no matter
the social forces surrounding them. Anger at the world shifts
attention from where real change is both needed and possible—in the choices individuals make—and leads instead
to further airy plans for state action [. . .]. Be angry at the
kids who did it. (Doherty 1998)

Doherty’s comments are interesting for several reasons.
First, his view that “evil could be traced to its root cause, the
one thing that makes it possible no matter what outside forces
are brought to bear: individual choice,” is an articulate statement of voluntarism. Voluntarism combines a cultural model
of persons as free to choose their actions with a focus on the
proximate actor (“the kids who did it”) rather than more
distal agents. Doherty is aware of social forces acting on individuals, but his schema is that someone of strong character
(even shooters as young as the two youths in the shooting
incident he refers to above, Mitchell Johnson and Andrew
Golden, who were only 13 and 11 at the time) will resist such
forces. This is a view that Americans are supposed to share,
and indeed many Americans would respond very positively
to this message in other circumstances.
Yet, significantly, Doherty’s summary of public discourse
about the Jonesboro school shootings, which could equally
well have been applied to commentary about the Columbine
school shootings, and his embattled tone (Strauss 2004)—the
very fact that he has to argue for the view that we should “be
angry at the kids who did it”—support my contention that
in these school shooting cases the general inclination was to
blame someone or something other than the shooters. As I
show below, only a small minority of all the comments I
looked at said that the shootings were the result of Harris
and Klebold’s individual choices and blame rested with them.
Paradoxically, while scholars like those cited earlier criticize
Americans for overly simple voluntarist views, social critics like
Doherty criticize Americans for departing from voluntarism.
Finally, Doherty’s statement also makes clear the political
stakes of assigning blame, hinting at a divide not only between
big-government liberals and small-government conservatives
but also between libertarians like himself who favored laissezfaire social policies and social conservatives who were just as
ready as liberals to blame large social forces and institute social
programs to correct them. Indeed, the only difference between
liberals and social conservatives was which social forces they
blamed.
Blaming Guns
In some of the commentaries on the shootings, persons are
thought to be freely choosing agents, but a distal actor is
blamed. This places the shooters in a larger social context, so
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it is not classic voluntarism. Consider, for example, this argument for gun control:
The tragedy in Littleton, Colo., was not caused by music,
Hollywood, video games or some “subculture.” [. . .] It was
caused by millions of people who buy guns and support
the National Rifle Association. (David Sawatzki, letter,
Omaha World-Herald, April 29, 1999)

Here the shootings at Columbine High are portrayed as
the outcome of millions of individual, fateful choices to buy
guns and support the NRA. Sawatzki seems to imagine each
of the gun buyers and NRA supporters as free to act differently, but his statement still widely diffuses moral responsibility. Although extreme, it was typical of the large numbers
of comments that blamed the ready availability of guns for
the shootings. Some gun control advocates may conceive of
the shooters as freely deciding how to act, with their access
to guns only multiplying the numbers of dead. Alternatively,
some gun control advocates may hold that the ready availability of guns was what Catholics call an “occasion of sin,”13
creating a temptation to act murderously. This is a more subtle
and contextualized schema of human action. Either way, if a
distal actor is blamed, this is not voluntarism of the classic
sort, of which Doherty’s statement is a clear example.
Blaming Popular Culture
There is a clear shift away from the notion of a decontextualized, free actor in the following, frequently heard explanation that the shootings can be traced to Harris and Klebold’s
exposure to violent music, video games, and movies such as
Natural Born Killers or The Basketball Diaries (Pratt 2001, 39):
There’s a lot of evil in the video games that they play. Somebody’s always bopping somebody else or killing ‘em off. I
think it’s overexposure to violence. [. . .] I think what you
see all the time slowly but surely has an impact on you.
(Interview with Maggie Hughes, retired office worker)
Show children violence, sex and killings, and they will be
violent, sexy and killers. (Nancy Pauley, letter, Omaha
World-Herald, April 29, 1999)

These comments reveal a folk version of social learning theory,
based on an empiricist theory of knowledge, according to
which observed behavior, especially if it is demonstrated by
someone who is admired (fictional or real), is remembered
and enacted. Choices are shaped by example and suggestion.
This cultural model is the source of much public policy in
the United States regulating the “adult” content of movies,
television shows, video games, and other media.
13. “Occasions of Sin are external circumstances—whether of things
or persons—which either because of their special nature or because of
the frailty common to humanity or peculiar to some individual, incite
or entice one to sin” (Delany 2005 [1911]).

813

Others placed popular culture itself in a wider social context:
Littleton is shocking, but sadly not surprising anymore. We
are getting used to this now. When one considers the state
of civilization in America, is it any surprise that occasionally
this is what society disgorges? Hollywood moguls have paid
their mortgages a thousand times over on just this sort of
bloodshed. [. . .] And we get to watch the inevitable crossover from news to entertainment from the so-called news
media. Give the tragedy a name; show it every night—just
like the Olympics. [. . .] But what the hell. We’ve got our
SUV with a rack; we’ve got our mutual funds; we’ve got
our 48-inch TV. We’re literally printing money and the economy is churning like a runaway train. To where, and toward
what end, I wonder. (Tom Beatty, letter, San Francisco
Chronicle, April 29, 1999)

Beatty sets out a complicated causal chain: culture industry
executives driven by economic calculations feed the desires of
shallow consumers, producing audience-pleasing violent messages that shape people’s behavior. Notice the lack of individual
agency in his phrase “this is what society disgorges.”
Blaming the Moral Climate
Social conservatives’ explanations for Columbine particularly
focused on long-term cultural trends going back to the 1963
Supreme Court decision banning mandatory prayer in
schools:
ACLU sues and the supreme court rules that God is an
outlaw in the school. Children stop packing their bible to
school and begins toting their guns to school. (CHo101272)
For more than 30 years this Godless vacuum has reaped the
fruits of contraception, abortion, infanticide, euthanasia, assisted suicide and pornography and so entrenched a culture
of death that we now see children killing children. (Nancy
Czerwiec, letter, Chicago Sun-Times, April 30, 1999)

Calling the shooters “children,” although Dylan Klebold was
17 and Eric Harris was 18 at the time, hence adults or nearly
so in many of the ways U.S. society defines adulthood, reinforces the writers’ message that Harris and Klebold were
victims of cultural forces beyond their control.
Blaming the Parents
Many commentators blamed not the moral climate or the
popular culture industry but the shooters’ parents for permitting their kids to be exposed to violent media or simply
for failing to notice that their sons had an arsenal of weapons
and were plotting to kill their classmates:
I know when one of my kids has had a bad day much less
is plotting a massacre. (MissPeachyMagoo)

Like some advocates of gun control, those who blamed the
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shooters’ parents may have assumed that their morally blameworthy actions were voluntarily chosen. Nonetheless, they
placed the shooters in the social context of their family, blaming a distal agent, the parents, rather than the proximate ones,
the shooters themselves.
Others saw family life as shaped by larger social dislocations:

and make good choices, in Shane’s pruning metaphor agency
is in the hands of the parent/gardener, not the child/branch,
whose fruiting appears to be the result of some combination
of natural forces, involuntary individual traits, and parental
guidance.
The newer Nurturant Parent model departs even further
from voluntarism:

We’ve got away from our basic values, more or less—our
home and our families and what’s most important. It seems
to me like nowadays it’s just, it’s out there, you know, you’ve
got to make a living, you’ve got to make that money and
this is the easiest way to do it, computer games and this,
that, and the other. Kids come home and they eat cold cereal
or they grab a quick snack or something like that and the
parents come in and, “Oh, don’t bother me, I’m busy, I’ve
got—.” They bring their work home with them and it’s
just—To me that’s not a good society. [. . .] My parents
tried to give me a better life, I tried to give my kids a better
life, they try to give their kids a better life. And by the time
their kids get grown, life probably won’t even be worth
anything, as far as that goes. And that’s about the way it
seems right now, is the reason why all these people are
getting out there killing each other, in school and everything.
(Interview with Jack Allen, general laborer)

I can’t figure out why a child isn’t getting their needs met
from the family unit where they have to resort to violence.
(Interview with Jane Edwards, professor of business)

There may very well be something to (voice shifts, as if she’s
quoting a standard explanation she has heard) maybe the
parents weren’t around enough and—(back to her own voice)
But I think that has a lot to do with society too, with, you
know, if you have to work. While there are a lot of opportunities in this society, you do have to work very hard,
I think, to be able to provide the things that you feel like
you should provide for your family? (rising intonation, looking for confirmation) And I think sometimes it does take
you away from your [family] a little more. (Interview with
Kelly Hall, sales representative)

Still others portrayed the killers as shaped not by their
parents’ absence but by what they did when they were present.
Such comments reflect the two U.S. cultural models of child
rearing that Lakoff (2002) terms the “Strict Father” and “Nurturant Parent” moralities. Here is an example of the Strict
Father model from a born-again Christian:
I think a lot of problems can be traced back to parenting
. . . too much freedom for kids too young, [no] discipline.
I think if you discipline someone, it’s because you love ’em.
I mean, just like God says in the Bible, you know you prune
branches that are bearing fruit to bear more fruit. Those
that are not bearing fruit, you break off and throw ’em in
the fire. (Interview with Daniel Shane, small business owner)

While advocates of strict discipline in parenting would doubtless say that their goal is to mold children into the sorts of
adults who will take personal responsibility for their actions

This sounds like a popular version of psychotherapeutic discourses that place blame on parents who damage their children’s psyches by failing to satisfy their psychological needs
(cf. the upper-middle-class soft individualism described by
Kusserow 2004). Again, notice the lack of agency in Jane
Edwards’s phrase, “where they have to resort to violence.”
The folk theory that children’s actions are the result of the
way they were raised is not held universally. In a discussion
that makes for a fascinating comparison with U.S. discourses
about Columbine, Riesman (1990, 183–84) analyzes an incident in which his four-year-old daughter broke a small sauce
pot at a Fulani house they were visiting in Burkina Faso:
I was immediately upset and embarrassed, and took her
accident as a reflection on me. . . . This attitude amounts
to my denying, without realizing it, that she was an independent centre of will and action; it seems to have been
based on the tacit premise that it is I who made her the
way she is and hence it is I who am the cause of what
happened. . . . The fascination children have for the Fulani,
and the pleasure they get from being with them, come from
the fact that, to them, children have an essence or character
that adults perceive as inviolate and as developing on its
own quite apart from parental training or influence. In the
Fulani view, children grow up under parental care, but not
because of parental influence.

In that case Riesman was advised not to replace the pot and
was told that even if a child were to kill someone else’s cow
or horse, the miscreant’s parent would not be asked to pay.14
By contrast, in the United States after the Columbine shootings, the parents of one of the victims sued the parents of
the shooters.

14. Naomi Quinn (personal communication, June 26, 2006) points
out that Western parents also sometimes act as if their children had their
own “essence or character.” I suspect that there is a difference, in the
United States, between explanations for the behavior of one’s own children and explanations for that of other people’s children. Negative behaviors on the part of someone else’s child are often attributed to bad
parenting, but the negative behaviors of one’s own child may be chalked
up to the child’s inborn character (see the discussion of the self-serving
attribution bias below).
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Blaming School Social Structures
Other commentators on Columbine blamed the social structure of schools (cf. Ortner 2003), rather than, or in addition
to, the family, for Harris and Klebold’s violence:
[in response to a posting that said, “ERIC AND DYLAN’S
SOULS ARE BEING BURNED BY THE DEVIL IN
HELL!!!”] It will probably turn out that Eric and Dylan are
flourishing in heaven, because they have made us look a
little bit closer into the hellpit that is public high school.
They went to correct a grave injustice. They were driven to
madness by bullies and bad parenting, not by video games,
heavy metal, or violent movies. How can you punish these
boys if they don’t know any better. Who should be burning
in hell are the ones who drove them to such madness, that
being their parents and the bullies who constantly tormented
them, both physically and mentally. (MDDrost)
Maybe people started picking on D and E in like, 4th grade
or something. When I went through, that was the grade
where the cruelty really started up. Sure, it warps your mind
when it’s clear to you that the authority figures who are
supposed to protect you obviously could not give two sh∗ts
about you or maybe they agree with your tormenters that
you are a dweeb. [. . .] Maybe they had just been ostracized
to the point of not being that functional anymore. I thought
about it like as if this were a pack of apes, and there are
those runty adolescent males who have less than no status.
It makes you freaky. (SportsPT)
The various teen groups, like the “freak”, and “gap-girls”,
and “varsity/cheerleader” groups tend to isolate certain
other kids who don’t fit in. I believe that Columbine was a
sick high school for all this type of student behavior. So
many of these children picked on each other, and made the
targeted teens the object of scorn. [. . .] I personally hold
the school responsible for what happened at Columbine.
(KatFC2L2)

According to MDDrost, SportsPT, KatFC2L2, and the many
others who defended Eric and Dylan in the anonymous electronic discussions, the boys suffered from a kind of temporary
insanity (“driven to madness” [MDDrost], “It makes you
freaky” [SportsPT]) caused by unbearable provocation and
low social status. Some saw Harris and Klebold’s response as
akin to a cornered animal’s preservation instinct. Others even
saw the shooters’ response as a heroic form of resistance:
OH WELL ONLY A WIMP WOULD SIT BACK AND IGNORE SOMEONE PICKING ON THEM!!! I PRAISE
THESE BOYS FOR STANDING UP FOR THEMSELVES!!!!
(Juhanmf36)

Juhanmf36’s agency concept is largely voluntarist. Saying that
Harris and Klebold are to be praised implies that they are
responsible for their actions. Still, even Juhanmf36 also sees
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their actions as reactions to provocation, which is an example
of what Markus and Kitayama (2003) call a conjoint agency
model, not supposed to be typical of Westerners. Cultural
models of joint determination by social entities beyond the
individual is certainly implied in the comments blaming the
shootings on the NRA, violence in the media, the ACLU and
the Supreme Court, bad parenting, status hierarchies in
schools, and modern life in general.
Individualistic But Not Voluntarist Explanations
Individualistic explanations for the Columbine shootings (i.e.,
ones that focus on causes arising from within the shooters
themselves) were not entirely absent. However, voluntarist
explanations were just one of three different sorts of individualistic explanations in the Columbine commentary. The
other two focused the shooters’ mental disorders or their intrinsic character. Although, in practice, mental disorders, intrinsic character, and voluntarist explanations can be difficult
to distinguish, in their prototypical cases they rest on different
schemas of agency, have different implications for moral responsibility, and usually lead to different approaches to punishment for wrongdoing.
Here are some examples of explanations in terms of mental
disorders:
The Columbine killers were most likely mentally ill—depressed and/or bipolar. More needs to be done in this country to help mentally ill children and adolescents. (CZ544)
How many more “experts” will offer their opinions on what
caused this? Has anyone considered that these two kids were
nuts? (Alex Koseluk, letter, Omaha World-Herald, April 29,
1999)

Legally, the broad category of mental disorders (as opposed
to the narrower one of insanity) is controversial as a factor
mitigating criminal responsibility in the United States, reflecting popular opinion that some mental disorders are severe
enough to render the miscreants unable to distinguish right
from wrong and voluntarily control their behavior while others are not.15 However, some people (probably CZ544, for
example) would no more blame Harris and Klebold for actions resulting from their mental illness than most people
would for the physical incapacity of someone weakened by
multiple sclerosis.
It is also important to separate individualistic explanations
focusing on intrinsic character from those highlighting bad
choices, because these have different implications for punishment. If someone is intrinsically immoral, rehabilitation is
out of the question. This is clear in the reaction of one of
my interviewees, Cynthia Patterson, to a different school
shooting that occurred shortly before I conducted my inter15. See, for example, Huckabee (2005) and http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Diminished_responsibility.
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views in the spring of 2000. In this case a six-year-old Michigan boy, Dedric Owens, shot and killed his young classmate,
Kayla Rolland:
CP: You know, the little boy that took the gun to school
and shot the little girl several weeks age, was in first grade?
p
CS: p He’s a first grader.
CP: A first grader. I would not, and now, granted that child
shouldn’t be tried as an adult by any means, but I certainly
would never want him in school with my children, or your
children. He needs to be separated from society, he obviously
doesn’t (small laugh) have any regard for anyone else that,
it’s just, there are some people that are immoral, they are
born with no feelings for anyone or anything. (Interview
with Cynthia Patterson, customer service representative)

For Patterson, Dedric Owens was “born with no feelings for
anyone or anything” and there was no hope of change.
Voluntarist Explanations
To appreciate the difference between intrinsic-character and
voluntarist explanations, compare Patterson’s comments
above with those of Sally Smith regarding the same case:
CS: What do you think they should do? What would you
do if you were in charge of doing something with that little
boy?
SS: He would go to reform school until age 21.
CS: Is that what you think they should do with him? Put
him in reform school?
SS: Mm-hm. ((CS: yeah)) Hang a picture of her on the wall
everyday so he could see what he had done and make him
think about it every day that he’s in there. (Interview with
Sally Smith, mill worker)

Smith implies that Owens could repent and change, a voluntarist view that fits the Christian model of the individual
who can at any time leave a life of sin and choose God.
Only one other interviewee offered what could be construed
as a voluntarist explanation of the school shootings, and it
was not his main explanation. Voluntarist explanations were
also quite rare in the newspaper editorials. Out of the 106
editorial columns and letters I examined, only 1 stated and
only 5 implied that these rampages were caused by the shooters’ voluntary choices. The lone explicitly voluntarist statement came, oddly, from a University of Massachusetts sociology professor, John Hewitt, who wrote that while “science
has taught us to look for peculiar social or psychological
circumstances” in cases of this sort,
the two dead members of the “Trench Coat Mafia,” together
with their fellows, might simply have chosen evil in circumstances where others choose to play football or to crave
membership in the National Honor Society. (John Hewitt,
op-ed, Boston Globe, April 29, 1999)
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In practice, it was sometimes difficult to differentiate
among these individualistic, dispositional explanations. Some
people described the shooters as “sicko” or “psycho,” terms
that ambiguously implicate bad intrinsic character, curable
mental illness, or a mix of the two. And how should we
interpret the AOL messages describing Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold as “cowardly” or “pussys,” masculinist language that
relates individuals’ moral choices to toughness of character?
Are “cowards” and “pussys” conceived of as intrinsically
weak-willed? Or as having chosen an easy way out? Still, despite the difficulties in some cases of categorizing responses,
by my best count only 10% of the newspaper editorialists,
8% of my interviewees, and 13% of the AOL message board
writers16 employed voluntarist discourse to explain the Columbine shootings and incidents like it. Why was voluntarism
rare in this context, when it is so common in other contexts
in the contemporary United States?

Uses of Voluntarist and
Nonvoluntarist Discourses
The Columbine shootings were an opportunity for Americans
to air worries about everything they felt was wrong in their
society: too-easy access to guns, lack of family togetherness,
violent images in popular culture, bullying and teasing in the
schools, and a decline in religious and moral values. The
cultural critique came not just from liberals or experts but
from average Americans across the political spectrum. It is
understandable that people would take advantage of the circumstances to voice their concerns and promote the causes
most important to them. Moreover, it should now be clear
that in discussing such issues Americans have available a large
repertoire of discourses embedding a range of cultural models
of personhood, agency, and moral responsibility. In talking
about school shootings, whether speakers blamed guns, parents, bullies, popular culture, or the shooters’ voluntary decisions seemed to depend on their larger rhetorical goals.
Some of the purposes served by voluntarist moral attributions can be seen if we examine the one communicative
context in which a number of commentators did place responsibility on the shooters or someone like the shooters.
This was in the online message board responses to comments
praising the shooters. A posting that started the longest discussion thread I examined had the subject heading “GLAD
THEY DID IT I WOULD HAVE TOO” and went as follows:
i’m glad they did it schools ebcoem a real hell hole now a
days what with pregnut mother at 15 and 16 to fights everydamn day i’m glad they did it it shows of bad lfies gonntin
for teenagers now a days its sucks having to deal with sex
drugs and peerprusser adults don’t relise it anymore its not
16. I counted screen names, rather than messages posted, because some
writers had multiple postings.
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sweet nice children its madness! if i ahd been those kids
and could have done it over agin teh only thing i would
have chagne was the bodie count its would ahve been more
teachers and students dead! (XBrokenxDreamsx5)

This posting evoked strong reactions. Some were compassionate, drawing on the nurturing parent, mental disorders,
and social learning models described earlier:
It’s a shame that you have such a low self esteem!! Youre
parents must have, or still do treat you very poorly! So sorry
to hear that! (Arizonandnpony2)
This could be the same hopeless frame of mind those 2
shooters were in. How can this not be seen?
(PeaceHarmny1)
I was really sad to see your comments . . . I was a teenager
many years ago and we had many of the same problems
you are facing . . . The only difference I can see . . . is the
trash and garbage that you are subjected to in the movies,
tv, so called “MUSIC”. . . seems everyone is on a race to
the BOTTOM! SO SAD! I really feel badly for you! (ShirHg,
ellipses in the original)

Other messages in this thread blamed bullies and parents:
innocent people died because apparently the school thought
as did mine when I was growing up, that the problems with
bullying and tormenting that a few “out” kids experience
are not worth the waste of thier time when there are more
“important” things (such as not suspending any star athletes
that are doing the tormenting) to take care of. until of course
after years of abuse someone snaps and kills “important”
people. (ShihtzuID3)
ONCE AGAIN IT IS EVERYONE ELSES RESPONSIBILITY
BUT THE PARENTS–I HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR
BRINGING THESE CHILDREN INTO THE WORLD AND
SHUFFLING THEM OFF ON SOCIETY TO RAISE–PUT
THE BLAME WHERE IT BELONGS-ON THE PARENTS–
(Ecran5)
BAD PARENTING EQUALS BAD KIDS . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . (RBendtsen)

Other writers focused on XBrokenxDreamsx5’s “sick” (intrinsically bad) character:
U sick and twisted person. You will have to face your maker
and I know you will be going straight to HELL. I hope u
rot there to (Clarissandbilly)
you are a sicko and I hope the f.b.i. traces your message.
u.r. as sick as they were (Wesmar11)

Still others, however, focused neither on XBrokenxDreamsx5’s
intrinsic character nor on her social circumstances but instead
urged her to take control of her life. (I say “her” because one
participant in the discussion looked up XBrokenxDreamsx5’s
screen profile and web site.) Their comments revealed dif-
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ferent versions of voluntarism, some secular, others religious,
some harsh, others encouraging:
This whole way of thinking is spawned by laziness and a
misdirected approach to living. Anyone, whether they’re a
popular cheerleader or jock, or a successful musician or
businessman or artist or athlete or whatever, doesn’t feel
good about themselves because of how other people treat
them, but because of what they do for themselves. You have
to put in the effort to find activities, jobs, hobbies, etc. that
you can take satisfaction in. When you do that for yourself,
it doesn’t mater what other people think of you because
you don’t need them to feel good. [. . .] But this stupid,
lazy piece of shit would rather direct all his energy towards
hatred and anger than making life better for himself.
(Murrayaaron30)
Perhaps if you had paid attention in scholl and learned how
to spell and construct a sentence properly, you would not
be such an angry moron. (RAM2CITY)
who ever wrote this statement obviously is a little pussy and
I would like to have just 5 minutes alone with him/her. You
think your sooo bad ass and shit. such an angry youth, well
dude if your so angry and you want a body count come
find em. I’ll rip your lungs out and put you on the top of
a body count listed with title of wanna be little pussys. so
til then cut the shit and grow up. [. . .] next what are you
gonna say 9–11 was something america deserved? are you
gonna feel sympathy for pussy little arab guys? [. . .] its kids
like you saying you woulda joined the gunlittleboypussys
(not gunmen), please you would have been one of the first
ones crying for you mommy! so seriously grow up and stop
writing such horrible things (USANavyAO2)
more whining fr school kids it is tough growing up you
have to be strong!! yes you will survive it!! (SchnppJ78)
You think being picked on in school is a reason for people
to die? You can’t tell ME how hard it is in school. I just
graduated last year, and I went through all of it. I got picked
on, jumped, exposed to the drugs, the stupidity, the judgments, the peer pressure, the insane zero tolerance rules,
dictator like teachers, and the bullshit educational system.
None of this is any reason at all to take a life [. . .] You
want a better life? MAKE a better life for yourself, because
that is the only way it’s going to happen. [. . .] LIFE IS
WHAT YOU MAKE OF IT. (EndlessAfterglow1)
I pray the Lord will touch your heart and that you will only
take responsibility for your own actions by NOT giving in
to peer pressure and realize that you can make your own
decisions. (Arizonandnpony2)
I wish you peace and calming in the world. Recognize your
power for the positive. (LoriSLCThorntn)

These are all examples of voluntarist discourses, marked by
certain characteristic keywords and formulaic phrases: “Any-
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one [. . .] doesn’t feel good about themselves because of how
other people treat them, but because of what they do for
themselves” (Murrayaaron30), “grow up” (USANavyAO2),
stop “whining [. . .] you have to be strong” (SchnppJ78),
“LIFE IS WHAT YOU MAKE OF IT” (EndlessAfterglow1),
“take responsibility for your own actions” (Arizonandnpony2), “Recognize your power for the positive”
(LoriSLCThorntn). While their comments are expressed differently because of their sources in different specific social
discourses, all urge XBrokenxDreamsx5 not to blame others
but to believe in her or his own power to change circumstances. Comments of this sort came from 23% of the 70
screen names participating in this thread—still not a majority,
but almost double the percentage of participants that offered
such comments in all the message board postings I analyzed.
These phrases sound so typically American: Why were they
not more common? It is not that the writers needed the
anonymity offered by the AOL message board to utter these
ideas, which are supposed to be the American civic religion.
Rather, the anonymity of the online message boards permitted
expression of the taboo idea that the Columbine shooters were
justified and the threats of desperate writers like
XBrokenxDreamsx5. Most Americans did not participate in
discussions with someone who praised Harris and Klebold
and threatened similar actions, hence they had no need to
reply with voluntarist language. Voluntarist discourse is useful,
however, as a means of attempting to deter potential future
killers, like those who celebrated Harris and Klebold. What
is striking about all of the voluntarist quotes above is that
(with the exception of RAM2CITY’s) none is purely explanatory; instead they use imperatives and second-person pronouns to exhort XBrokenxDreamsx5 to “make a better life
for yourself.”
I have observed this in other contexts as well, and I would
venture that one of the primary uses of voluntarist discourses
in the contemporary United States is to motivate others to
change their behavior. In this respect voluntarist discourses
are distinct from more distal responsibility attributions and
even from other individualistic explanations, for example,
those attributing behavior to intrinsic character. Compare, for
example, Clarrissandbilly’s comment: “U sick and twisted person. You will have to face your maker and I know you will
be going straight to HELL. I hope u rot there to,” in which
XBrokenxDreamsx5 is cast as irremediably evil, with
USANavyAO2’s harsh but ultimately more encouraging “cut
the shit and grow up [. . .] seriously grow up and stop writing
such horrible things,” which assumes that XBrokenxDreamsx5 could act differently.
Voluntarist discourse is also useful as a retort to proposals
for social policies that the speaker opposes. For example, a
common response in the United States to social assistance for
the poor is a voluntarist comment like the one we saw above
in Doherty’s Reasononline essay: “Avoiding pregnancy, educating oneself, and becoming self-sufficient are within the
power of most individuals, no matter the social forces sur-
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rounding them. Anger at the world shifts attention from
where real change in both needed and possible—in the choices
individuals make.” In the context of commentary about
school shootings, a common response to calls for gun control
was “Guns don’t kill, people do.” One of my interviewees,
Jack Allen, quoted above, brought up school shootings before
I did as an example of problems with modern society. In the
context of his problems-with-modern-society social discourse, it made sense to play down the shooters’ agency. As
he kept talking, he mentioned children’s access to guns as a
modern problem, but then, probably because he is also a
National Rifle Association member, he switched to its standard, individualistic criticism of gun control:
Really I don’t think there’s any way of actually keeping any
weapon, and that’s ANY weapon, away from anybody. And
that’s from a child right on up. I mean you could take a 2year-old, he could walk into your kitchen and pick up a
knife, he can pick up a fork, he can go outside and he can
pick up a rock. I mean there’s weapons everywhere. Anything you want to use is a weapon. Anything you choose
to pick up. There’s where it comes back again is what’s in
the mind of that person.

This was the only other possibly voluntarist explanation, in
addition to Sally Smith’s, that any of my interviewees offered,
and Jack Allen only brought it up at that point to argue against
gun control.17
But whereas voluntarist discourses are handy for speakers
who wish to deflect attention from social context to individual
responsibility, they are not at all useful for speakers wishing
to instigate social action. If school shootings are the result of
individuals’ free choices, nothing can be done to stop them.
Saying that Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold “might simply have
chosen evil in circumstances where others choose to play
football or to crave membership in the National Honor Society” (Hewitt’s op-ed, quoted above) and leaving it at that
would be of little comfort to parents, teachers, students, and
policy makers who wanted to take some action to prevent
future school shootings. The shootings at Columbine High,
which were part of a well-publicized series of school shootings
in the 1990s, made many Americans fearful for their safety
and the safety of their children in places where they thought
they could be safe (suburban and rural schools [Newman et
al. 2004]). The school shootings led to maturity ratings on
video games18 and metal detectors and antibullying measures
17. I say this is “possibly voluntarist” because Allen may have been
thinking that “what’s in the mind of that person” depends on voluntary
choices (“Anything you choose to pick up”) or he may have been thinking
that it depends on larger social forces of the sort that he had been talking
about a few minutes earlier (“We’ve got away from our basic values . . .”)
or both.
18. “The shooting deaths of 12 students and one teacher—and the
suicides of the two teenage gunmen [at Columbine]—led then-President
Clinton to ask the FTC to investigate whether entertainment companies
were trying to attract children to adult-rated movies, music, and electronic games” (Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2001).
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in schools and helped motivate the Million Mom March for
gun control. Blaming distal forces that could be changed probably helped people feel they could control these events. I
suspect that this is part of the reason that voluntarist discourses were rare in this context.19
Perhaps another part of the reason that discourses of personal responsibility and individual choice were rarely applied
to the school shooting cases in the United States is that most
of the shooters were white and middle-class. It is instructive
to compare Cynthia Patterson’s comments about the six-yearold shooter, Dedric Owens (“there are some people that are
immoral, they are born with no feelings for anyone or anything”) with her initial response when I asked her to comment
on “all of these school shootings that are happening all over
the country,” a phrase that probably brought to mind Columbine and similar examples. Her first response was “The
people with the guns are the ones that are responsible for it.
That’s . . . I can’t imagine [. . .] having a gun in the house
that’s that accessible to a child.” I wondered whether it was
significant that in most of the U.S. school shootings in the
1990s the killers were white, like Patterson, while Dedric
Owens was African American. Or that Sally Smith, who is
African American, consistently gave voluntarist explanations
when I asked about school shootings in general and when
she discussed the Dedric Owens incident in particular. There
are other possible explanations for Patterson’s inconsistency:
Maybe she felt that Owens’s murderous actions at such a
young age were proof of his innate immorality. But it is also
possible that this is an example of what some social psychologists call the “ultimate attribution error” (Pettigrew
1979), a tendency to give actor-blaming dispositional explanations for the problematic behavior of out-group members
but mitigating situational explanations for the problematic
behavior of in-group members.

What Are “Cultural Conceptions
of Agency”?
Yet, it is too simple to end the story at this point. At a deeper
level we should ask what it means to say that society X has
such-and-such a cultural conception of agency. Along with
multiplicity of contents and contexts, I also found variety in
the form of ideas about agency (Strauss 1997) and in their
cultural standing, by which I mean how accepted the view is
in the speaker’s opinion community (Strauss 2004a). In my
interviewees’ talk about public events and their own lives
sometimes voluntarism was just taken for granted, while at
other times voluntarism was highlighted explicitly and argumentatively. Explicit, argumentative uses of voluntarism
19. I am reminded here of Malinowski’s prediction that magic will be
resorted to in situations of high uncertainty and emotional salience as
an attempt to assert control. Concern about the Columbine shootings
and readiness to final distal causes for them helps to explain the popularity
of Michael Moore’s 2002 documentary Bowling for Columbine (as Thomas
Weisner pointed out to me [personal communication, May 22, 2006]).
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were the norm in the commentary about the Columbine
shootings, to the extent that voluntarism was invoked at all.
This sort of argumentative, explicit voluntarism I will call
defensive voluntarism. I mean “defensive” not in the psychoanalytic sense but in the sense that the speaker is defending
voluntarism against alternative explanations.
In distinguishing different forms of voluntarism (one
taken-for-granted and implicit, the other defensive and explicit) I am repeating the distinction Bourdieu drew between
doxa, the realm of unstated beliefs that are so hegemonic they
are not even recognized as beliefs, and dogma, the realm of
explicit beliefs that, having been contested and lost the “primal
state of innocence of doxa” (Bourdieu 1977 [1972], 169), now
are recognized as one alternative among others. Defensive
voluntarism fits this definition of dogma: a reply to challenges
rather than an unexamined assumption.
An example of voluntarism as doxa can be seen in the
comment of another interviewee, Catlyn Dwyer,20 explaining
why she did not go to college: “Well, I turned down scholarships in journalism and foreign languages and—because I
wanted to get married, I wanted a child.” Her statement rests
on a taken-for-granted model about the life course for women
of her generation and class in the United States—that it was
her choice whether to go to college or to get married and
have a child. It is with respect to such choices (e.g., whether
and whom to marry) that voluntarism truly is a widely shared,
doxic cultural model in the United States.
Yet, despite Bourdieu’s rather hard-and-fast distinction between doxa and dogma, voluntarism exists in both forms in
the United States. For example, Catlyn Dwyer also expressed
voluntarism in an explicit, dogmatic way. In an earlier interview, discussing her decision not to go to college, she added,
“But I guess the older you get the more mature you are and
the way you look at things is different. And as I try now to
tell my granddaughters and the daughters-in-law, ‘You can
do anything. Anything you want.’” That line, “You can do
anything. Anything you want,” is an example of defensive
voluntarism because it foregrounds the person’s power to set
goals and act on them, implicitly contradicting alternative,
more constricting gender-role messages that Dwyer feared her
granddaughters and daughters-in-law might be receiving.
Returning to school shootings, the voluntarist responses of
the AOL subscribers to XBrokenxDreamsx5 quoted above are
examples of defensive voluntarism because they are deliberately posed to counter her placement of blame on her peers.
They are stated in the unmitigated, emphatic way (e.g., “You
want a better life? MAKE a better life for yourself, because
that is the only way it’s going to happen. [. . .] LIFE IS WHAT
YOU MAKE OF IT”) that is typical of beliefs the speaker
takes to be the common opinion (Strauss 2004a). However,
the fact that voluntarism requires such pronouncements
shows that it is contested. The explicit, defensive form of
voluntarism that was typical in commentary about school
20. She chose “Catlyn” as a pseudonym because she is a cat lover.
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shootings indexes its cultural standing (Strauss 2004) as one
alternative among others——a highly valued alternative, it is
true, but one that faces competition.
What remained at the implicit, doxic level in the explanations for the Columbine shootings was not the assumption
of individual control over events but of human control. Just
one interviewee (Daniel Shane, the born-again Christian
quoted above) and only two out of my sample of AOL messages blamed the devil or satanic forces; in all of the comments
I analyzed, only one said or implied that the shootings were
fated, and no one mentioned sorcery. The explanations offered for school shootings were diverse, but all assumed a
naturalized, disenchanted world. It is not that beliefs in fate,
God, and satanic forces are absent in the United States, but
for most people21 their use is confined to specialized contexts.
To sum up, we need a middle way between a theory of
culture as deliberate rhetoric (e.g., Carrithers 2005) and a
theory of culture as implicit cultural models (e.g., Holland
and Quinn 1987). Each has a piece of the truth.

Discourse about School Shootings in
Psychological, Cultural, and Historical Context
The way U.S. Americans assigned blame for the Columbine
shootings exposes the variety of cultural models of agency in
the contemporary United States. This event was unusual for
the wide variety of cultural models it tapped and perhaps also
for the small role that voluntarism played in the explanations,
but competing nonvoluntarist discourses and defensive voluntarist responses were well-established before the shootings.
Contention between nonvoluntarist and defensive voluntarist
discourses of agency characterizes recent and ongoing debates
about a number of other important social policy issues in the
United States. Here are some examples:
Criminal justice. Advances in brain imaging have given defense lawyers a new tool: the argument that their clients’
behavior was caused by brain abnormalities that can be demonstrated with brain scans. Others, such as the legal scholar
Stephen Morse, have responded with a formula reminiscent
of opponents of gun control: “Brains do not commit crimes;
people commit crimes”(quoted in Rosen 2007, 52).
21. There are exceptions in discourse about other events, such as the
late televangelist Jerry Falwell’s statement that the 9/11 attacks were a
message from God: “The abortionists have got to bear some burden for
this because God will not be mocked. And when we destroy 40 million
little innocent babies, we make God mad. I really believe that the Pagans,
and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians
who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the ACLU,
People For the American Way—all of them who have tried to secularize
America—I point the finger in their face and say ‘you helped this
happen’” (http://www.religioustolerance.org/reac_ter7.htm). It is notable,
however, that Falwell’s explanation for 9/11 was never widely embraced
by the American public. Similarly, following Columbine, in all of the
popular commentary I analyzed, even social conservatives who shared
Falwell’s views about the dastardly influence of the ACLU and like groups
still gave a naturalistic explanation of their effects.
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Educational failure. In 1998, when my son was in elementary school in Durham, North Carolina, signs appeared
around his school saying, “You choose to make good decisions” and “Make good choices.” If he misbehaved, the form
he brought home would say, “Nathaniel had two time outs
today. The choice he made was _____ (“starting to throw a
rock on the playground” or “singing in his annoying voice
at circle time”). Please talk to him about making better
choices.” When I asked his teacher why the school had
launched this “good choices” campaign, she said that the
children in that school, many of whom were bussed in from
the inner city, were told too often that they could not do well
because they were poor or because they had learning disabilities. She deliberately started the “Make good choices”
campaign as a way of empowering them—a clear example of
defensive voluntarism. At the same time a friend in New
England whose seventh-grade son had failed several of his
classes told me that, although she was going to get him tested
for a learning disability, the school had informed her that the
latest theory among educators was that failure is the result of
the child’s poor choices.
Poverty. During the 1990s there was a shift in antipoverty
policy in the United States, culminating in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, which eliminated the previous federal guarantee of assistance to the poor. This change in policy was backed by
resurgent voluntarist discourse. As Norris and Thompson
(1995, 6) point out, by the 1990s, although “many policymakers still believed that environment, culture, or other external circumstances created poverty . . . the idea of choice
and welfare dependency was increasingly dominant in the
competition of ideas that helped to produce proposals on the
active policy agenda.”
Indeed, the interdiscursivity among these disparate public
policy issues was stressed in Doherty’s Reasononline comment,
which related the Jonesboro school shooting to “all sorts of
social problems for which politicians scramble to find solutions, from single-parent households to drug abuse to longterm welfare dependence.” Rhetorical exchanges between defenders of nonvoluntarist and voluntarist cultural models are
common in the contemporary United States. Is this complexity in cultural models of agency peculiar to this place and
time?22 I do not have the comparative cross-cultural and historical information to answer the question, but I can suggest
some possible answers.
Multiple Models of Agency as a Universal
Meyer Fortes (1983 [1959]) posited the universality of two
sorts of religious explanatory principles: fate (exemplified by
22. Such debates go back at least 50 years, as Dan Segal (personal
communication, July 9, 2006) has reminded me by pointing to Stephen
Sondheim’s lyrics to “Gee, Officer Krupke,” from the 1957 musical West
Side Story. The song satirizes contradictory American cultural models for
explaining deviant behavior.
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the story of Oedipus) and personal moral responsibility to
gods or ancestors (exemplified by the story of Job). While
some religions stress one principle more than the other, he
claimed, the universal possibilities of each “reconcile the two
main alternatives in the hazardous progress of the individual
from the state of unchecked dependence, as an infant at the
mother’s breast, to that of constrained independence, as an
adult and citizen” (p. 40).
An alternative to this psychoanalytic argument for the universal prevalence of both voluntarist and nonvoluntarist cultural models would be the social psychological explanation,
mentioned earlier, of the ultimate attribution error. The ultimate attribution error has an individually focused counterpart,
the self-serving attribution bias, which is a tendency to give
dispositional attributions of one’s own good actions and others’
bad actions but situational attributions of one’s own bad actions
and others’ good actions (Miller and Ross 1975).23 If a selfserving attribution bias and the ultimate attribution error
were universal, we could expect that in every society there
would be different ways of explaining actions, implying different assignments of moral responsibility, depending on
which explanation would enhance the image of the speaker
or the speaker’s social group or detract from the image of
others, even if the particular form of the explanation did not
look exactly like contemporary American discourses of responsibility and blame (see Hill and Zepeda 1992, 197, and
Ahearn 2001a, who found this process at work in Nepal, but
see Duranti 1994 for different dynamics affecting attributions
of agency in Samoa).

23. Catlyn Dwyer’s explanations for not having gone to college furnish
a good example of self-serving attributions. Above I gave one example
of an explanation, in which she attributed this to her personal choice to
instead get married and have a child. That was in my second interview
with her. However, at the beginning of the first interview, shortly after
I walked in the door, she mentioned that she had turned down scholarships to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and East
Carolina University. After I officially started the interview, I asked her
about that:
CS: And you say you didn’t do it because . . .
CD: When I was in school women were nurses, teachers, secretaries,
or you got married. And I wanted to be a doctor, an archaeologist,
an astronomer, I mean those were the things I was interested in
but back then you were just kind of . . . dissuaded from doing
anything like that.
CS: So what did you do?
CD: I got married. (laughs) Had a child.
This is a nonvoluntarist explanation, attributing her decision not to go
to college to social pressure or perhaps internalized social learning. I
believe that she stressed social factors in that context because the nature
of my questions and comments leading up to this point might have
seemed critical of her decision not to go to college. This self-serving
attribution bias modifies what social psychologists call the fundamental
attribution error, or correspondence bias, which is the error of giving dispositional attributions when there is better evidence for situational causes
of behavior (Ross 1977).
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Multiple Models of Agency as Culturally and Historically
Variable
However, some cultural psychologists claim that there is not
as strong a tendency to present a favorable personal representation in every society as there is in the United States (e.g.,
Markus and Kitayama 1991; Mezulis et al. 2004) and there
may be a stronger tendency to commit the ultimate attribution error in the United States than elsewhere. Morris and
Peng (1994, 961–62) found that American newspapers were
more likely to attribute a mass murderer’s actions to his internal traits (e.g., “darkly disturbed man”) when he was Chinese than when he was American, tending to excuse the latter’s
actions as influenced by situational factors such as his recent
firing; Chinese newspapers were less likely to use different
explanations in reporting these two cases. Morris and Peng’s
study suggests that those Americans who saw the Columbine
shooters as like themselves (for example, because they were
white and middle-class) could be expected to look for blamemitigating situational attributions, but this tendency would
not be found everywhere.
A cultural rather than psychological explanation could be
that threats to the autonomy of the self are stressed in the
United States precisely because autonomy is an American
ideal. After all, valuing autonomy does not necessarily lead
people to believe that they are completely autonomous; the
effect could be just the opposite (see also Kusserow 2004).24
For example, in a study of conspiracy theories in Hollywood
films, Pratt (2001, 1) speculates,
Conspiracy theory is often symptomatic of more pervasive
anxiety among individuals concerning their ability to control
their lives. This seems especially true in the United States,
with its political culture so much a product of the grand
narrative of classical liberalism. [. . .] As Louis Hartz argued
in his classic study The Liberal Tradition in America, American
political thought begins and ends—indeed is virtually coextensive—with classical liberal ideology. Imbued with an individualist ideology reinforced by such cultural documents as
Emerson’s essay on “Self-Reliance,” Americans may be more
prone than citizens of other cultures to experience peculiarly
intense kinds of anxiety over what they perceive as a “loss of
24. Max Gluckman believed that the importance of ascribed kin ties
in small-scale preindustrial societies led to a greater emphasis on individual moral responsibility than in industrial societies with weaker kin
ties: “In Africa the response [to a moral crisis] is to call in a witchdetective, or a diviner; and I shall argue that what he does, in terms of
his occult beliefs, is to exaggerate the wickedness of individuals and, as
we see it, to hold them responsible for crises arising from struggles rooted
in the conflicts in social structure itself. [In the case of the English family
firm] an industrial consultant is called in, and he seems to do the opposite
to the diviner; he seeks to diminish resort to explanation in terms of
individual wickedness or weakness, and to relate difficulties objectively
to the exposure of the conflicts within the social system. . . . Thus the
tendency [of the industrial consultant] is to diminish, rather than to
exaggerate, the responsibility of persons for group and individual misfortunes” (Gluckman 1972, 5–6).
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autonomy, the conviction someone’s actions are being controlled by someone else, or that one has been ‘constructed’
by powerful, external agents,” producing a contemporary and
quintessentially postmodern psychological phenomenon
Timothy Melley has labeled “agency panic.”

Pratt’s discussion, while fascinating, is also somewhat contradictory: Why should “agency panic” be a “quintessentially
postmodern psychological phenomenon” if American political thought from the beginning has been based on the importance of autonomy? Indeed, Hofstadter’s “The Paranoid
Style in American Politics” (1964) covers conspiracy theories
going back to the late eighteenth century.
Other theorists, perhaps influenced by Weber, see fears of
loss of control not as specifically American but as a postmodern or late-capitalist phenomenon (Abercrombie, Hill,
and Turner 1986, 144):
There is some agreement that the early, self-reliant forms
of individualism are no longer relevant to modern society,
and indeed may be incompatible with it. There are indications in the literature that the character of Western, specifically English-inspired, individualism may have changed,
as individual and family capitalism declines, as the state
intervenes significantly in social and economic life, as the
market place is increasingly organized by large and multinational corporations, and as much of the old ideology of
unrestrained capitalist expansion is brought into question
by Keynesian economic principles. The result is a growing
pessimism about the autonomy and authenticity of the individual in modern capitalism.

Hollway and Jefferson (1997, quoted in Ungar 2001, 275)
speculate that the loss of a sense of control at present leads
to particular emphasis upon control of criminal behavior:
“Fear of crime is a particularly apt discourse within the modernist quest for order since the risks it signifies, unlike other
late modern risks, are knowable, decisionable (actionable), and
potentially controllable” (see also Marcus 1999 on contemporary conditions that have fostered loss of a sense of agency).
In addition to these structural changes, Abercrombie, Hill,
and Turner (1986) cite the development of the behavioral sciences, especially Freud’s emphasis on unconscious irrational
forces, as having undermined voluntarist conceptions. With the
development of the human sciences and their popularization,
what at one time appeared as autonomous choices can now be
explained as the result of neurological structures, ego and superego formation, social role models, or culture learning. In
demystifying and explaining human behavior, the human sciences undermine the concept of free will, which seems to rest
on an unscientific dualistic metaphysics of undetermined spirit
in opposition to determined matter. It may be that the rise of
social scientific systems of explanation has motivated, in response, the very explicit kind of voluntarism that I call defensive
voluntarism. However, voluntarism also probably had a defensive form in an earlier period when it was used to attack aristocratic ideologies of naturally given hierarchies.
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Conclusion
My major goal in writing this paper is ethnographic. Many
commentators persist in assuming that voluntarist views of
unfettered agency are securely entrenched in the United States,
but in fact a voluntarist model of human agency is only one
schema available at present for explaining human action. This
is not a subgroup difference: all of my interviewees used voluntarist discourse or made voluntarist assumptions at some
point in the course of our discussion, but they employed alternative cultural models as well. Voluntarism does have a special status in the United States. In certain contexts it is uncontested common sense. In other contexts, including sites of
widespread social anxiety, alternative cultural models of agency
provide a more persuasive interpretation. In its explicit form
voluntarism is the recognized orthodoxy, as Bourdieu would
have put it, and thus is often uttered in an emphatic, unqualified
way. Yet, the very need for emphatic pronouncement betrays
speakers’ awareness that voluntarism has to be defended.
One of the larger lessons I hope will be drawn from this
discussion is the importance of understanding how and why
people use the discourses they do in particular contexts. There
are many approaches to discourse analysis. If we start by assuming that one discourse is constitutive, we may overlook
contexts in which it is played down and misconstrue its place
in people’s conceptual schemes in relation to less obvious discourses. Another lesson is that when we encounter lofty statements of belief and value in our research, we should ask why
they need to be made—what, in the saying, is revealed of their
cultural standing.
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Comments
Laura M. Ahearn
Department of Anthropology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, U.S.A. (ahearn@rci.rutgers.edu). 10 VII 07
Strauss has written a thoughtful article about the multiple
conceptions of agency circulating in the United States today.
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It is indeed the case that some scholars (though by no means
all, as Strauss notes) posit a singular, individualistic notion
of agency in this society even as they produce complex, ethnographically nuanced analyses of meta-agentive discourses
in other societies. Strauss convincingly argues against this
practice. And yet, contrary to what she implies in the sentence
“We might think that conceptions as basic as those of personhood and agency would be hegemonic: both singular and
internalized as unexamined, taken-for-granted assumptions,”
hegemony, as Raymond Williams reminds us, is never total,
so it should not surprise us that hegemonic conceptions are
often accompanied by counterhegemonic ones. Strauss’s discussion of Bourdieu’s notion of doxa makes this point persuasively (though I would have preferred the use of Bourdieu’s
own “orthodoxy” and “heterodoxy” to the word “dogma”).
Strauss’s most important argument is her insistence that
comments about agency be analyzed contextually, for the ways
in which people attribute responsibility for an event will vary
with the specific interactional context. The two very different
explanations that Strauss’s interviewee Catlyn Dwyer gave her
for having married and had children illustrate this point beautifully. It seems a bit simplistic, however, to label such a complex phenomenon a self-serving “fundamental attribution error,” as Strauss notes many social psychologists would.
Whether or not this label is appropriate for Catlyn Dwyer, I
certainly believe it is not the best way to understand how
Nepalis attribute responsibility for their own or others’ actions
differently in different contexts.
Still, I am in basic sympathy with Strauss’s “person-andcontext-centered view of social discourses.” The question
arises, however, what constitutes appropriate contextualization. Linguistic anthropologists have written about this issue
at length. There are no easy answers, of course, but my own
preference would be for in-depth analyses of naturally occurring interactions in addition to the elicited interviews, online discussions, and newspaper opinion pieces that are studied here. I wonder whether Strauss’s statement that “this is
not a subgroup difference”—that is, that all of her interviewees used both voluntarist and nonvoluntarist assumptions at
some point during their interviews—might need to be reconsidered if her data included more naturally occurring conversations situated in everyday social contexts in different
communities within the United States. Would there, for example, be any gender differences in the way agency is conceptualized? There are a couple of tantalizing clues in Strauss’s
article that gender might be worth considering more closely,
as might class, race, ethnicity, geography, and other dimensions of difference.
I would also advocate a closer look at language. When
Strauss analyzes how people say something, she derives interesting insights, such as her observation that the unusually
numerous voluntarist remarks made in one online discussion
thread were characterized by the use of imperatives and second-person pronouns. More of this sort of analysis might
have revealed other interesting patterns.
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Overall, however, I strongly agree with Strauss that it is
very important that we ask “what it means to say that society
X has such-and-such a cultural conception of agency.” Strauss
begins to answer that question for this society at this historical
moment even as she calls into question the very notion of a
single, monolithic cultural conception of agency, and for this
reason this article is a valuable addition to the scholarship on
cross-cultural conceptions of agency.

Michael Carrithers
Department of Anthropology, University of Durham, 43
Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3 HN, UK (m.b.carrithers@
durham.ac.uk). 28 VI 07
This is a substantial contribution not only to ethnography but
also to theory in anthropology. It is also provocative in that it
sets the mind racing with further possibilities. Rather than
praise particular parts of Strauss’s argument—it speaks for itself
very well—let me take things up where she leaves off. She
concludes, “When we encounter lofty statements of belief and
value in our research, we should ask why they need to be
made—what, in the saying, is revealed of their cultural standing.” This is a good question or, rather, two good questions.
One question is about the relative weight of an item of culture
(an image, a story, an idea, a schema, a trope, a commonplace)
among all those which we might find current in a given social
and historical situation. This is an invitation to broaden our
attention comparatively, to open ourselves to the other items
of culture in that situation and to other similar items in other
situations across the world. It is a wide-angle question, so to
speak. The other question—why that statement of belief and
value needs to be made—focuses our attention narrowly, on
the occasion of speaking (or writing, or singing, or reciting, or
displaying) and its accompanying rhetoric.
Nevertheless, even here we may attain some breadth of
comparative understanding. Take, for example, the instance
of voluntarism which Strauss met in her son’s school. The
teacher had set up what might be called a routine rhetorical
strategy, namely, a form sent to the child’s parent in response
to an incident of bad behavior which announced that the
child had made one or more “bad choices” and that the parent
should “talk to [the child] about making better choices.” In
my own time as a parent in the UK I have noted several
occasions on which some parent or teacher has responded to
a particularly irksome behavior by a child with a more spontaneous, in-the-heat-of-the-moment version of this, to the
effect, “Why did you choose to [yell, laugh, cheat, hit Sally,
etc.]?” This is a simpler, more elemental version of the
teacher’s scheme, but even in its spontaneity it is already quite
complex. It does have the element of voluntarism, but it seems
rather an aggressive, rather than a defensive, voluntarism. It
projects a strong evaluation of a scene and refers not merely
to the agency of the miscreant but also to the perpetrator’s
accountability by means of imputing some conscious deliberation on the part of the miscreant. It is, in other words, a
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whole story in miniature, a minimal narrative, a “story seed”
(Carrithers 2007) and, indeed, one which can expand easily
enough to include the justified anger of the speaker.
The campaign for aggressive voluntarism in Strauss’s son’s
school is, so to speak, one step farther up the scale of rhetorical
premeditation from these spontaneous utterances. Posters
were displayed on the walls saying “You choose to make good
decisions,” for example, which gives some sense that the campaign was a rhetorical struggle against a rising tide of other
narratives. The libertarian opinion piece by Doherty is one
step farther still in rhetorical elaboration, being directed at a
wide public and carefully set against opposing views of agency
and accountability. Nevertheless, his basic narrative comprehends just those narrative elements—individual will, deliberation, accountability, righteous anger—which were present
in the other two cases.
So here is a story seed, an interpretation of situations, which
seems to have some life of its own across different occasions
of speaking and which could be compared with other competing interpretations on the American scene or with markedly
different story seeds in, for example, Melanesia (see Young 1983
for a particularly juicy comparator). In the context of Strauss’s
article, this observation implies, I think, that the concept of
“agency” is too bare, too rudimentary, to embrace what is of
interest in her argument. And it is notable that she quite frequently sets “person” in apposition to “agency,” because only
through that pairing can she effectively add the notions of
accountability and, to a degree, deliberation. Perhaps a better
way to put this would be to say that what is being compared
here is in fact not bare versions of bare agency but richer and
more articulate story seeds, however briefly stated and concentrated they may be. So in addition to the voluntarist story
we have the righteous-reaction-to-bullying story, the helplesstools-of-the-media story, and many others, some of which differ
from each other so much that we may wonder if they are
directed to interpreting the same event.

Michael W. Morris
Graduate School of Business and Department of
Psychology, Columbia University, Uris 718, New York, NY
10027, U.S.A. (mwm82@columbia.edu). 10 VII 07
Furthering a stimulating research program (1990, 1992, 1997),
Strauss analyzes the complex and diverse American discourse
about Columbine. My response concerns two arguments advanced in this process—one compelling, the other less so.
The first is that agency conceptions range on a spectrum
of “cultural standing” or sharedness that influences how,
when, and with what conviction they are expressed. Within
this Bakhtinian/Bordieuian framework, she dissects layers of
American agency discourse, revealing contending individualist and structuralist dogmas that rest on the common base
of human-causation doxa. Moreover, she traces dialectics in
which orthodox, individualist accounts of action spur het-
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erodox, structuralist rebuttals that are answered in turn by
defensive, hyperindividualist rejoinders.
Given the call for richer connections to psychology, some
parallels are worth noting. Classic conformity research by
Sherif, Ash, and others identified mechanisms through which
ideas believed to be widely shared influence one’s judgments,
even when they contradict firsthand experience and even
when the belief about sharedness is mistaken (see Prentice
and Miller 1996). Recent comparative studies find that culturally conformist or orthodox patterns of agentic judgment
are exhibited by individuals high in need for cognitive closure,
which seems to be provided by the use of highly shared concepts (Chiu et al. 2000; Fu et al. 2007). Moreover, these culturally conformist individuals are distinguished not by stronger personal commitment to the traditional agency concepts
but by stronger views that these concepts are high in cultural
sharedness or standing (Zhou et al. 2007).
The second argument challenges past psychological arguments about American culture and personal agency based on
the finding that “the general inclination was to blame someone or something other than the shooters.” This argument
suffers from conceptual flaws. First, psychologists’ evidence
about differences between cultures in agency discourse (Kashima et al. 2005) does not entail within-group homogeneity
or an Occidentalist picture of unnuanced individualism. Second, the argument conflates agency with blame/responsibility.
Analyses since Aristotle (1955 [330 BC]) have assumed that
responsibility attaches only to agentic behaviors but not to
all such behaviors, such as acts of passion or behaviors by
children. Similar exceptions are encoded in Anglo-American
common-law (albeit within a narrower conception of agency)
exceptions for insanity, irresistible impulse, and incapacity, as
well as in many other institutions and folkways. Psychological
research examines people’s use of such criteria beyond causality when assigning blame and how weights differ across
cultures (Hamilton and Sanders 1992; Zemba, Young, and
Morris 2006). In sum, lack of blame does not entail the lack
of assumed agency.
Additionally, there are evidential limitations. First, Columbine is not a good test case. The actors did not survive,
so they were not candidates for punishment. They were not
adults, which matters (see n. 4) because it implies less capacity
for self-control (Fincham and Emery 1988). The Jonesboro
shooters were charged as juveniles and punished lightly.
Second, Strauss’s sampling of discourse may have further
skewed her findings. Her interview question “How do you
explain all of these school shootings?” didn’t pinpoint Columbine. Some respondents referred to other shootings, or to
the trend of shootings, which obviously entails structuralist
explanations. Strauss’s remaining data are drawn from the
opinion pages of periodicals (op-eds, letters, etc.) and parallel
forums online. These sources yield interesting statements,
which she interprets with great insight, but I doubt that they
reflect the authors’ immediate causal attributions for the
event. In these forums, the event is but a pretext for airing
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heterodox opinions, Strauss (2004a, 187–88) herself has noted
that this genre is “by definition one for expressing debatable
and controversial views.” I explored this at www.nytimes.com
by searching for the first articles about Columbine, selecting
sections of the paper representing different discourse genres.
The first ten opinion articles replicated Strauss’s content: an
editorial about the increased availability of guns, op-eds about
America’s “addiction to violence” and changes in its suburbs,
and letters about counseling, cliques, gun control, the pressures of our “winner society,” and the diminished role of
parents. The first ten front-page articles focused more closely
on the immediate causal chain of the incident under headlines
such as “Portraits of Outcasts Seeking to Stand Out,” “Sketch
of Killers: Contradictions and Confusion,” and “2 Youths
Wanted to ‘Destroy the School’” that, I submit, describe the
shooters agentically in a culturally orthodox manner. This
exercise (which the interested reader could extend) suggests
that systematic sampling of discourse genres is crucial in assessing the prevalence and diversity of cultural conceptions.
This variation across sections of the Times underscores
Strauss’s first argument that culturally orthodox and heterodox agency conceptions are voiced in different discourse
genres. However, it also suggests that her data (sampled primarily from heterodox genres) do not overturn the view that
personal agency plays a larger role in the explanation of action
in American culture than in many non-Western cultures.

A. Jamie Saris
Department of Anthropology, National University of
Ireland, Maynooth, Ireland (ajamie.saris@nuim.ie). 4 VII 07
Seeking to confound the ideological ascendancy of an “unfettered personal agency” in the U.S.A. while contributing to
a venerable debate concerning the supposedly exceptional
quality of the Western understanding of self and person,
Strauss synthesizes a person-centered approach to agency
within a sort of ecology of such discursive formulations “at
large” in American culture. The “defensive voluntarism”
model articulated by some of her consultants circles around
the uncomfortable topic of the existence of evil. The mass
murder of children is overdetermined as social practice and
symbolic act, and the reasons given for it therefore speak to
more than cognitive models of individual motivations: they
reference and reproduce entire cosmologies. Further, statements about such motivations are culturally salient rhetorics
whose suasion strategies and genre forms are ignored only at
the peril of the analysis.1
The rash of school shootings of 1990s America was preceded decades earlier by a much larger mass murder in a
school. On May 18, 1927, the Bath Consolidated School in
1. I thank Rob Moore and Emma Heffernan for very helpful discussions based on an earlier draft of this work. Remaining mistakes and
opacities are my own.
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Michigan was all but destroyed by multiple explosions, killing
45 people and injuring a further 58.2 Most of the victims were
children. The perpetrator was a school board member and
janitor at the school. Andrew Kehoe, who blamed a property
tax that had been levied to fund the construction of the school
for the failure of his farm. Kehoe was very methodical in his
preparations, wiring hundreds of pounds of explosives over
several months.3 On the fateful day, having killed his wife and
blown up the structures on his foreclosed property, he drove
to the school in a truck containing another large explosive
charge and various bits of scrap metal and, pulling next to a
small crowd around the school superintendent, Emory Huyck,
detonated the dynamite, killing himself, Huyck, and several
others. Anticipating his posthumous notoriety, he had attached a sign to his farm fence stating “Criminals are made,
not born.”
A sentence in a contemporary report hints at the limits of
an analysis of simply the content of an “explanation” for such
an act while pointing us in the direction of form and structure:
“He was notified last June that the mortgage on his farm
would be foreclosed, and that may have been the circumstance
that started the clockwork of anarchy and madness in his
brain” (New York Times, May 20, 1927). This sentence is oddly
structured, moving from the past tense and past conditional
(while referencing a visible social-economic event) to the subjunctive mood in the dependent clause (while presuming an
occult physical lesion). A strangely mixed metaphor, “the
clockwork of anarchy,” implying both a fixed determinism
and a worrisome unpredictability, is the central image in that
clause. Strauss’s analysis of the overt content of her consultants’ statements elides these issues of rhetoric and syntax.
Minimally, then, there may be a good case for theoretically
distinguishing between agency and responsibility, with the
understanding that the relationship between these concepts
can be quite variable.4 In American English at least, the mood
of statements about agency is generally the subjunctive and
conditional, a construction of the horizon of possibility. The
mood of responsibility is generally the indicative and declarative, a retrospective fixing of cause and effect. Indeed, in
some of the data that Strauss presents (e.g., the statements
of Jack Allen and Kelly Hall) one senses a sort of covert
inferential mood that takes some time to settle into a declarative fixing of temporally prior causes to make sense of a
present, horrible effect.
2. http://www.crimelibrary.com/serial_killers/history/bath/, and see
also Parker (1992).
3. Kehoe’s life was the subject of much scrutiny thereafter, and the
answers that the inquest and the media discovered make for disturbingly
familiar reading in the way they gropingly connect fractured bits of a life
to ideas of responsibility for a horrific crime.
4. The Azande (Evans-Pritchard 1950), for example, attribute responsibility for witchcraft through the Poison Oracle but are flexible with
regard to their understanding of the agency of witches. They accept polite
formulations of lack of knowledge about possessing witchcraft substance
while assuming that witches attack simply because they are witches.
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Cognitive models organizing overt content while invoking
elicited “explanation” therefore get to only part of the issue.
Mass murder has “causal power” and therefore displays the
signatures of “agency” in part because of its event-ness. This
quality brings to consciousness nearly all of Hallowell’s (1955,
75–110) basic orientations—self, other objects, space and
time, motivation, and normative behaviour. Indeed, its very
horror constructs a watershed. This meaningful rupture is the
precondition for reflection on various social and moral imaginaries. The features attributed to the person who performed
such an act, then, do more than evidence “explanatory models”; they also recognize and reinscribe these fundamental
aspects of a culture.

Martin Sökefeld
Institut für Sozialanthropologie, Universität Bern,
Länggassstrasse 49a, CH-3000 Bern 9, Switzerland
(martin.soekefeld@anthro.unibe.ch). 5 VII 07
Strauss shows convincingly that voluntarist models of agency
are not as dominant in the United States as they are generally
assumed to be. Although voluntarism does play a significant
role in discourses about the Columbine shootings (and about
other events, we can assume), other conceptions of agency
are important, too, and their importance is signalled by defensive voluntarism—the explicit attempt to defend voluntarism against other models. Supplementing a by-now quite
long-standing debate that questions the “sociocentrism” of
“non-Western” conceptions of agency and self, Strauss adds
to a literature that equally questions simple ideas about “Western” concepts and their presumed voluntarism and egocentrism. Both assumptions are much too simple, as is the underlying opposition of “the West” and “the rest.” This should
be conventional wisdom by now.
Strauss attempts to explain the incidence of various concepts of agency in U.S. discourses. She points out that pure
voluntarism is used less in a descriptive or explanatory mode
and more as an emphasis on ideals and values. The tendency
she notes for voluntarist models to be employed to explain
achievement while situationalist ideas are often used to justify
failure also fits into this picture. Geertz’s distinction between
“models of” and “models for” resonates here. The two aspects
are not necessarily consistent, and neither needs to be the
overall “pattern of culture.”
Strauss’s article thus supports Fredrik Barth’s (2002) argument that culture “is” variation, and this brings me to a
question which is the flip side of this emphasis on variation:
What makes a model a cultural model? Strauss asserts that
voluntarism “does have a special status” in U.S. society—that
it is “in certain contexts the uncontested common sense.” Yet,
how common do competing models have to be in order to
be cultural, too? If they vary otherwise, are they cultural by
simply sharing opposition to a common sense?
Strauss and Quinn (1997, 6) argue that meanings (and
models or ideas) are cultural by virtue of arising from similar
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life experiences of people. In the conclusion of the present
article Strauss argues that variation of cultural models of
agency is not a matter of subgroup difference. Thus, the covariation of people’s experiences and their cultural models is
questionable or at least remains unclear.
In much contemporary anthropological writing, culture has
been reduced from a noun to an adjective. In other words,
it has been reduced from something that requires a definition
(a difficult and perhaps even impossible task, as we know)
to some rather ephemeral and volatile quality. In my perception the use of the attribute “cultural” is often motivated more
by disciplinary custom than by analytic rigour. In my understanding, the addition of the adjective “cultural” to the
various models of agency adds little to their explanatory
power. Strauss’s article shows that ideas that are supposed to
be shared in society are not actually shared (or not to the
presumed extent). What is shared, then, is the assumption of
“sharedness” or the representation of certain ideas as being
shared and “cultural.”

Karen Sykes
Department of Social Anthropology, Room 5.11 Roscoe
Building, University of Manchester, Manchester M139 PL,
UK (karen.sykes@manchester.ac.uk). 10 VII 07
Strauss argues that “voluntarism” as a moral philosophy is
popularly espoused in American discourses that both recognize individual agency and attribute moral blame and that
such everyday uses of voluntarism demonstrate that American
personhood and agency are multifaceted rather than singular
cultural forms. Her argument that anthropologists should
complicate moral agency has already been well established
(Battaglia 1999, 1995; Moore 2007). Her new contribution is
the analysis of “blaming” as a paradoxical moral discourse
that she names “defensive voluntarism.” The recognition that
voluntarism must be defended does not undermine trust in
such a dominant ideology of moral agency. In effect, voluntarism is defended as moral philosophy while wilful acts
of atrocity are blamed on other social forces. I remain a little
unclear about defensive voluntarism. It does not answer the
more complex question about voluntarism raised by this case:
why do a few young people lack the will to restrain the enactment of a violent fantasy of unfettered individual volition?
One way to examine the popular uses of voluntarism is to
compare them with another form of moral reason pertinent
here. Specifically, how do people reason about the suffering
of the victims of school shootings? Moral reason is not culturally specific but a general human activity. A comparison
with the Papuan New Guinean case shows that, while youth
violence may be structured differently, Papua New Guineans
and Americans share the capacity to reason morally. The comparison provides an opportunity for a fuller assessment of
voluntarism as a form of moral reason.
Outside the circle of journalist’s reports on the racial and
anticolonial violence of assailants, Papua New Guineans who
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tried to understand Raskol violence tended principally to empathize with the victims while at the same time reporting tales
of almost inhuman social acts (for example, the Raskols who
murdered an elderly shopkeeper and eviscerated his pregnant
daughter had stolen a police car in the capital by exploding
a gunpowder-packed fish carcass in the police station and
escaping with a car from the protective compound). At first
I gave most of my attention to the equivocal respect for these
tales of Raskol banditry, and I can confirm that Kulick’s
(1993) analysis of Raskols as “Heroes from Hell” is mostly
correct; Papua New Guineans are concerned to understand
how acts of Raskol violence may also be acts against new
socioeconomic hierarchies created by vectors of change beyond their control. However, in time I realized that Papua
New Guineans were only superficially interested in the heroics
of the young criminals as fighters against the moral injustice
of incipient economic injustice. They focused not on the volition of the young people who committed violent crimes but
on the pain and suffering of the victims and aimed to show
that they empathized with it.
Strauss limits her inquiry to popular discussions of blaming
in mostly public forums in which her informants attributed
moral culpability to criminal youth. She defines moral culpability in terms of different forms of volition, either conscious and forthright or indirect and defensive. Her interest
is to demonstrate empirically that different forms of moral
agency coexist in America, with “defensive volition” being a
kind of moral argument that paradoxically defends volition
while condemning inhuman uses of it. But her argument ends
before it addresses the paradox that placing blame judges the
inhumanity of specific acts and is not only about the bending
of the human will by extrapersonal forces.
Discourses about the suffering of the victims and their
families in the school shootings are missing from her assessments of volition, but such discourses do exist and include
tales of suicides by relatives as well as those of friends’ finding
new lives after grief. Only some of Strauss’s informants empathize with the victims. They say that inhumanity is the result
of having “no regard for others.” Considering this comment,
perhaps it is finally possible to understand volition as a form
of moral agency. Moral agency is an act of volition only when
potential murderers reason through the paradox that they
cannot enact their will without causing pain to their victims
(Arendt 1954). I must ask what is so powerful about the idea
of volition as a form of moral agency that stops Strauss from
addressing the greater paradox that humans must find the
moral reason to constrain the will.

Reply
The key issues in this interesting set of comments seem to be
the relation of agency to moral responsibility, my methods,
my criticism of some related work in cultural psychology,
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implications for a theory of culture, and, finally, the moral
point of this research.
Agency and responsibility. One thing I learned reading these
comments and other work they cited is that the relation of
agency to moral responsibility is complicated. Being part of
a causal chain that culminates in some harm is not sufficient
to earn moral reprobation: the actor’s willful intention to
cause harm is often necessary as well. For this reason, as
Carrithers points out insightfully, the voluntarist accusation
⬙Why did you choose to do such-and-such?⬙ is stronger than
⬙Why did you do such-and-such?⬙ (see also Sykes’s comments). Saris (n. 4), however, reminds us that this is not
universal: Azande witches can be held morally responsible
even if they had no conscious intention to harm. Without
examples I cannot assess Saris’s claim that ⬙the mood of statements about agency is generally the subjunctive and conditional⬙ whereas ⬙the mood of responsibility is generally the
indicative and declarative,⬙ but his view that these are different
kinds of judgments is well taken. Sykes states, ⬙Her argument
that anthropologists should complicate moral agency has already been well established,⬙ but some of the work she cites
(e.g., Moore 2007) focuses on anthropologists’ theories of
agency rather than ethnographic analyses of U.S. Americans’
theories of agency, which was my subject matter.
Methods. Ahearn and Saris would like to have seen a finegrained discourse analysis, and Saris gives a wonderful illustration of the possible payoffs of such analysis with the ⬙clockwork of anarchy⬙ line from commentary on the 1927 Bath
School massacre. In Strauss (2004a) I show how cultural
standing is marked by such discourse features as contrastive
stress and modal auxiliaries, but I judged that level of detail
not necessary for my argument here.
Ahearn expresses a preference for ⬙analyses of naturally
occurring interactions in addition to the elicited interviews.⬙
But what are the chances I would happen to hear commentary
about school shootings when my fieldwork was in 2000 and
the most notorious such shooting (Columbine) had occurred
a year earlier? I also think that the phrase ⬙naturally occurring
interactions⬙ should not be accepted at face value. In what
sense is an interview any more ⬙unnatural⬙ than a conversation in my presence between one of my consultants and
her Great-Uncle Fred? That chat, even without an anthropologist present, might be more forced and less revealing.
Anthropological interviews may be uncommon, but they are
no more artificial than any of the others (e.g., medical, market
research, talk shows) that make this an ⬙interview society⬙ (as
Atkinson and Silverman [1997] put it disparagingly). Rather
than search for an uncorrupted natural occurrence, we should
consider how the context of the interview might influence
our results (see also Quinn 2005).
Morris gives a pertinent example of possible context effects,
making the good point that my question ⬙How do you explain
all of these school shootings?⬙ refers to ⬙the trend of shootings,
which obviously entails structuralist explanations.⬙ His comparison of opinion and news articles about the Columbine
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shootings in the New York Times is particularly interesting. It
is true that editorials express a wider variety of explanations,
including controversial ones, than news stories, but there are
constraints on the latter stories: In the New York Times, especially, they are supposed to be more focused on the ⬙facts⬙
and less on speculations about distal causes. Even with those
constraints, there are hints of less individualist explanations.
For example, the news article ⬙Portrait of Outcasts Seeking
to Stand Out⬙ suggests that Harris and Klebold might have
been motivated by their exclusion from Columbine High’s
popular student athlete cliques.
Morris also questions whether Columbine is a good test
case, in part because the shooters ⬙were not adults, which
matters . . . because it implies less capacity for self-control.⬙
But that didn’t stop some of my interviewees from employing
individualistic explanations in other cases of juvenile crime,
such as the shooting by 6-year-old Dedric Owens or another
horrific crime I asked some of them about, the sexual assault
and murder of a 10-year-old North Carolina girl, Tiffany
Long, by a 15-year-old boy with the help of two companions
who were 13 and 17 years old. The incident had occurred in
Burlington, one of the sites of my study, two years before my
interviews. I deliberately asked my Burlington interviewees
for their opinions about it because the victim was white while
the boy who killed her and his companions were black; I
wondered how the racial dynamics of the incident would
affect their answers. What I found was a split. Some interviewees treated the offenders as youths who could not be
expected to be responsible, blaming instead their family situation or gang influences, but others waved aside the issue
of their age: ⬙The child has adult ideas⬙ (Jack Allen), ⬙The
acts that he committed were those of an adult⬙ (Cynthia Patterson). My interviewee Bobby Powell imputed a racial-hostility motive to the killer: ⬙And whether we like it or not,
there is, it’s always the white doesn’t care for the black, but
in many, many cases the black sure doesn’t care for the white.⬙
As in the case of the Jena 6, one has to question why the
young Jonesboro shooters, who were white, got off with a
light punishment, while the young African-American perpetrator in the Tiffany Long case received a sentence of life
imprisonment amidst calls that he be executed.
Cultural psychology. The different causal explanations my
white interviewees gave for the actions of young white killers
versus young black killers are predictable given some social
psychologists’ observation that U.S. test subjects more readily
give blame-mitigating situational attributions for the antisocial acts of in-group members than for those of out-group
members. That is why (pace Ahearn) I find this theory useful
as a partial explanation for my findings. One of my favorite
demonstrations of this ultimate attribution error is Morris
and Peng’s (1994) comparison of newspaper coverage of two
shooting sprees, one by a Chinese student, the other by an
Irish-American postal worker. In an influential recent article
on cultural differences in ⬙implicit theories of agency,⬙ Morris,
Menon, and Ames (2001, 174) summarize those 1994 findings
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as follows: ⬙U.S. newspaper accounts of murders were more
likely to stress individual persons as causes . . . whereas Chinese news accounts were more situational, stressing factors
such as group relationships.⬙ While this conveys the overall
cultural difference, Morris overstates his previous finding, failing to mention that they found the same proportion of situational attributions in the U.S. and Chinese news stories
about the Irish-American postal worker. However, my major
criticism of work in cultural psychology on cultural differences in causal attributions is not their portrait of ⬙withingroup homogeneity,⬙ as Morris puts it. It is that their construct of two models of agency, which are supposed to
correlate with two polar kinds of cultures (Anglo versus East
Asian), overlooks important differences within each of these
types. For studies in legal culture, for example, it is important
to know not just whether in a given society there is a tendency
toward individualistic explanations but also whether such attributions focus on a defendant’s intrinsic character, mental
disorders, or voluntary choices.
Culture theory. Sökefeld, Carrithers, and others ask what my
findings mean for our theories about culture. As Sökefeld suggests, the trick is to get the balance right between the extremes
of a Cultures-are-homogeneous-and-unchanging view and an
All-is-contextual-variation-resistance-and-change view. Cultural psychologists, who have the unenviable task of persuading
their colleagues that psychological laws are not as universal as
they thought, are pulled toward the former. Anthropologists
concerned to correct overly static and homogeneous views of
culture are drawn to the latter. Sökefeld asks what remains of
the claims Quinn and I voiced earlier (in Strauss and Quinn
1997) that common experiences give rise to common cultural
models. He suggests two paraphrases for my views: that ⬙culture
‘is’ variation⬙ and that all that is shared is ⬙the assumption of
‘sharedness’ or the representation of certain ideas as being
shared.⬙
I do not hold either of these ideas of culture, although I
can understand why a reader might think so. I am concerned
to highlight the variation that exists in causal attributions in
the United States. The reason I chose to analyze how people
explained Columbine and other school shootings, using the
discourse genres I did, is that, as Saris puts it, the Columbine
massacre was a ⬙watershed⬙ event that brought to the surface
a wide variety of common discourses. My point is not that
the preponderance of nonindividualist discourses I found is
typical but rather that these alternative discourses are readily
available to people in the United States not just for the fortunately rare instances of school shootings but also for many
other explanatory purposes. As Ahearn proposes, there is
probably subcultural variation in resort to different discourses
because discourses are more likely to spread through opinion
communities that have been exposed to them and found them
compelling, given their characteristic experiences. When I
said, ⬙This is not a subgroup difference,⬙ my point was only
that there is not some privileged demographic group that
always employs voluntarist discourses in contrast to other,
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less privileged, groups that always conceive of personal agency
as constrained. All of my interviewees employed both voluntarist and nonvoluntarist discourses, depending on the
context.
I also think it important to pay attention to variation in
cultural standing, and it seems that all the commentators
agree, although there was some misinterpretation of defensive
voluntarism, which is voluntarist discourse used to respond
to nonvoluntarist counterdiscourses. Cultural standing analysis can be applied to Emerson’s essay Self-Reliance, cited by
Morris, Menon, and Ames (2001, 173) as an exemplar of a
U.S. text in which group agency is ⬙denied or disparaged.⬙
Emerson does disparage taking direction from others, but the
fact that he needed to write such an essay indicates that he
felt that too often his compatriots did the opposite. Emerson’s
ideas about trusting in one’s own judgment may have been
widely shared, but they were not so ingrained that they just
went without saying.
However, what paying attention to cultural standing should
also do is remind us that some values, beliefs, and practices
do go without saying. In some contexts, as I mentioned, voluntarism is taken for granted in the United States. So too is
a tendency to explain unexpected horrible events naturalistically, without resort to fate, sorcery, Satan, or God’s will.
Furthermore, a cultural model does not have to doxic to be
widely shared among people who acquire it from their similar
experiences. It could be the common opinion or even debatable. Sökefeld asks whether competing cultural models are
⬙cultural by simply sharing opposition to a common sense.⬙
If they are learned and widely shared, perhaps because they
emerged to counter a dominant view, they are cultural. I stand
by our argument (Strauss and Quinn 1997) that any theory
of culture needs to account for both unifying and fragmenting
tendencies.
The moral point. Sykes wonders why there is so little talk
in my sample about the suffering caused by school shootings.
A few of my interviewees and AOL message board writers
did express concern for the victims, but because they were
not relevant to my focus on how the shootings were explained,
I did not include these comments. Her main point is that I
should have addressed not popular explanations for school
shootings but why killers lack empathy for their victims. The
development of empathy is a topic that interests me greatly
(Strauss 2004b), but it was not germane to my topic here.
Instead, I had a different moral purpose. Too much public
policy in the United States is based on the assumption that
we are a take-personal-responsibility-for-your-actions society.
Many Americans do hold this view, but they readily voice
alternative ones as well. My goal was to reveal this complexity
and the hypocrisy that sometimes hides it in the hope that
this will lead to better ways of dealing with our social ills.
—Claudia Strauss
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